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
AN INTERNATIONAL QUARTERLY
OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

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SPRING • 1957

VOLUME TWENTY-FOUR

NUMBER ONE



Social Research

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OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

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SUBSCRIPTION: \$5.00 a year for United States and Canada,

\$5.50 a year for other countries

SINGLE COPIES (exclusive of postage): \$1.50

SOCIAL RESEARCH is published in Spring, Summer, Autumn, and Winter issues, appearing in April, July, October, and January, by the Graduate Faculty of Political and Social Science of the New School for Social Research, in cooperation with the Research Division of the New School. All correspondence concerning manuscripts should be addressed to Dr. Alvin Johnson.

April 1957

NOTES ON THE CONTRIBUTORS

ERICH HULA is Professor of Political Science and International Law in the Graduate Faculty of the New School.

HANS NEISSER is Professor of Economics in the Graduate Faculty of the New School.

CH'U CHAI, who received his American training at Stanford and at Northwestern University Law School, has taught in several Chinese universities, and was formerly Dean of the Law School at National Chungking University. He is now residing in this country, and is the author of numerous works on legal subjects and on Chinese culture and philosophy.

QUINCY WRIGHT, Visiting Research Scholar at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Visiting Professor of International Law in the Graduate Faculty of the New School, is widely known for his writings and activities in the field of international relations.

EDUARD HEIMANN is Professor of Economics in the Graduate Faculty of the New School.

Indexes of SOCIAL RESEARCH are published annually in the Winter issue; the contents are also indexed in the INTERNATIONAL INDEX TO PERIODICALS and the PUBLIC AFFAIRS INFORMATION SERVICE, available in most libraries. Microfilm copies of complete volumes of SOCIAL RESEARCH are available to regular subscribers, and can be purchased from University Microfilms, 313 North First Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

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FUNDAMENTALS OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY*

BY ERICH HULA

THE question of the way in which an organization for collective security ought to deal with aggression, if and when it occurs, has been a matter of heated discussion ever since the founding of the League of Nations. To recall some of the ideas that were set forth theoretically in those endless controversies on the fundamentals of collective security may help us to appreciate and understand the problems which we have confronted in the recent practice of the United Nations and which no doubt will plague us in the future as well.

I

The system of collective security is intended to assure the peaceful existence of all members of the international community by establishing and implementing two basic legal principles.¹

The first fundamental principle of collective security is the prohibition of force. Every war, and even every threat or use of force short of war, by one state against another is legally prohibited and thus unlawful. Since the prohibition of force is meant to be absolute, it applies to what the classic theory of international law has called just wars as well as unjust wars. According to the philosophy of collective security, "there is no distinction between *just* and *unjust* wars. Save two exceptions, all war is aggression, even if started on account of a wrong suffered by a

* AUTHOR'S NOTE—This essay is part of a study being prepared on legal and political problems of the United Nations.

¹ League of Nations, *Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, Committee on Arbitration and Security. Memorandum on Security Questions, submitted by M. Politis, Rapporteur, League of Nations Document C.A.S.10 (1928.IX.3) p. 14, par. 53.*

State."² The two exceptions are war waged by an individual state in self-defense, and participation of a state in the collective enforcement action undertaken by the international community itself.

The second fundamental principle of collective security is a corollary of the first. Every violation of the rule prohibiting the threat or use of force is legally a matter of concern to the whole community of nations, and not only to that state which is immediately affected and directly injured by the breach of that rule. This principle is as radical a departure from nineteenth-century notions as the absolute prohibition of force. War waged by one state against another was, according to traditional international law, a strictly bilateral affair. No general rule of the law of nations prevented other states from adopting and pursuing, in case of war, a policy of neutrality involving the same rights and duties on their part toward both belligerents. According to the philosophy of collective security, each and every member of the international community is, as a matter of principle, required to render assistance, in some form or other, to the state against which the breach of the peace has been committed, and to help in some way or other to restore the peace.

This collective guarantee³ is, it is true, designed to assure to all members of the family of nations the enjoyment of peace and security just as much as is the prohibition of force itself. The obligation of mutual assistance has no other purpose but to render the prohibition of force effective. Hence the notion that the planning and preparing of a practically fool-proof mechanism of collective measures for repressing aggression and war is the best way of preventing them. The certain prospect that overwhelmingly strong forces of the organized community will automatically be deployed against an aggressor is assumed to have a deterrent

² *Question of Defining Aggression*, Report by the Secretary-General, U. N. Assembly, Seventh Session, A, General, A/2211 (October 3, 1952) par. 349, quoting a statement made by Mr. Ricardo J. Alfaro in the International Law Commission. Text references to *Question* are to this Report.

³ The term "guarantee" is used by Politis in *League of Nations*, *op. cit.*

effect on the use of individual force. It is further true that the international community, if and when it is actually compelled to take collective action, does so, strictly speaking, to ensure respect for its own authority and interest. The action, including military measures of all kinds, is therefore, by intent, both politically and legally different from war as an instrument of national policy waged by individual states.

However, being virtually a contest of arms between the law-upholding community and the law-breaking aggressor state, the execution of what is meant to be a guarantee of peace is still war, in terms of human misery, political and social dislocation, and economic losses. In Woodrow Wilson's words, it turns what "is intended as a constitution of peace" into a "League of War."⁴ But it is not the only and not even the most striking paradox of the system of collective security that the very agency whose *raison d'être* is to save mankind from the scourge of war should serve as the machinery for waging war. By obligating, in principle, all members to participate in the taking of collective measures, including military measures, against an aggressor state, it is apt to transform any particular war into a general war, and thus tends by widening war to increase its evil effect.⁵

The system of collective security is the legal expression of a change in our moral evaluation of war. From the moral approval of just wars and an attitude of moral apathy toward unjust wars, we have in recent times been moving in the direction of unqualified moral condemnation of all individual wars except those waged in self-defense. The system is also a recognition of the change in the character and the consequences of modern war. It expresses

⁴ David Hunter Miller, *The Drafting of the Covenant* (New York 1928) vol. 2, p. 562. Some forty years later, Sir Benegal N. Rau was to remark in relation to the United Nations action in Korea, "Circumstances have forced the Security Council into an unprecedented role; in fact, we are functioning at the present moment almost like a war council": U. N. Security Council, *Official Records*, 478th Meeting, July 28, 1950, p. 6.

⁵ League of Nations, International Studies Conference, *Collective Security*, ed. by Maurice Bourquin (Paris 1936) pp. 7, 146. Text references to *Collective Security* are to this volume.

the realization that its increasing destructiveness and its tendency, due to the growing interdependence of the contemporary world, to implicate other states are likely to make war—any war—a threat to civilization as such. Unfortunately, however, it can hardly be maintained that the system of collective security offers a truly novel answer to the age-old question of how we might prevent war. For it is fundamentally nothing but an adaptation to current international politics of the time-honored but somewhat dubious maxim: *Si vis pacem para bellum*. In fact, the war by which the system of collective security proposes to fight war is a "contingency to be dreaded"⁶ more than the war envisaged previously in that maxim.

Thus, ever since the organization of the international community under common institutions was advocated and undertaken, there has been general agreement that collective security must not be relied upon as the only means for preventing war. Even the system of collective security itself has often been defined in much broader terms than those comprising merely the prohibition of recourse to force and the guarantee of its observance by a mechanism of collective coercive measures.⁷ But regardless of whether or not one restricts the concept of collective security to these two basic legal principles, there can be no doubt that they need to be supplemented by other principles, devices, and procedures, if the elimination of war from international politics is to become possible and the dire contingency of sanctions be avoided.

The most obvious additional requirement for preventing war is to provide for pacific methods of settling international disputes and to ensure their actual application, if and when the methods of traditional diplomacy fail. But it is not sufficient that media-

⁶ League of Nations, *Reports and Resolutions on the Subject of Article 16 of the Covenant*. Report by M. de Brouckère, League of Nations Document A.14.1927.V (1927.V.14) p. 70. The French text of this document speaks of *une éventualité redoutable*.

⁷ In League of Nations, *Collective Security* (cited above, note 5), the term "collective security" covers practically all functions of a peace organization. Somewhat less broad is the scope Paul Barandon gives it in *Das Kriegsverhütungsrecht des Völkerbundes* (Berlin 1933) pp. 1 ff., 279 ff.

tory and conciliatory procedures begin to operate "when the spectre of war appears."⁸ To render a system for the organization of peace effective, its agencies must possess authority to intervene before a situation has actually led to serious international friction or given rise to a more or less clearly defined dispute. In fact, they require some general authority to promote and preserve an international order in which the rational causes of international conflict will no longer be operative. To put it in General Jan Smuts' words, an organization of peace, if it is to be effective and to last, "must become part and parcel of the common international life of states, it must be an ever visible, living, working organ of the polity of civilization. It must function so strongly in the ordinary peaceful intercourse of states that it becomes irresistible in their disputes; its peace activity must be the foundation and guarantee of its war power."⁹

There is thus, in theory, general agreement that for preventing war effectively the collective-security powers of an international peace organization need to be supplemented by other devices and policies. There is also agreement that, on the other hand, the effectiveness of the mediatory and conciliatory powers of such an organization is likely to be increased by the prospect of coercive measures, if its members fail to fulfill the obligations they have undertaken for peaceful settlement of international disputes.¹⁰ But it has always been controversial what relative weight and importance should in practice be attached, in planning and building an international peace organization, to pacific procedures on the one hand, and to procedures of collective coercion on the other. And it has been equally controversial whether and how the agencies of an international organization should combine those procedures when actually dealing with aggression.

⁸ Miller (cited above, note 4) vol. 2, p. 25.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Charter of the United Nations. Report to the President on the Results of the San Francisco Conference* by the Chairman of the United States Delegation, The Secretary of State, Dept. of State Publication 2349, Conference Series 71 (Washington 1945) p. 87.

The two main trends of thought to which this controversy on the fundamentals of collective security has given rise have been most clearly elaborated in the discussion on the definition of aggression that started in the early 1920s and has ever since been carried on inside and outside first the League of Nations and then the United Nations.¹¹ It is therefore appropriate to reconsider those basic issues in the context and terms of that discussion.

II

The movement for a legal definition of international aggression was initiated and sustained by statesmen and scholars who were inclined to rely primarily on the coercive measures provided for by the system of collective security as an effective means of preventing war. The definition of aggression was conceived of by them as one of the essential requirements for assuring the practically automatic operation of the system and thus guaranteeing its intended effect of deterring aggression. This function of the proposed definition is clearly indicated by the historical context in which the movement originated. The first attempts at definition coincided with and were a part of frantic efforts made in the early 1920s to strengthen the collective-security provisions of the League of Nations Covenant. In fact, in those attempts probably lies the chief historical significance of both the abortive Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance of 1923 and the equally abortive Geneva Protocol of 1924.

The Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance gives us yet another clue to the philosophy that inspired the endeavors toward a legal definition of international aggression. The authors of the Covenant of the League conceived of unlawful resort to war as an act morally so atrocious and socially so harmful to the entire international community as to call for counteractions on the part of all of its members, rather than for mere redress by the party

¹¹ A bibliography of important writings on the question of defining aggression is contained in Louis B. Sohn, *Cases and Other Materials on World Law* (Brooklyn 1950) pp. 801 ff.

immediately affected by the breach of the law. Municipal law qualifies morally opprobrious and socially harmful unlawful acts as crimes subject to public punishment. Thus the fathers of the Covenant, following the terminology of municipal legal systems, might very well have qualified unlawful resort to war as crime, and repressive measures against it as punishment. Actually, however, they refrained from extending these domestic notions to the international field, preferring to keep within the traditional terminology of international law, which "resembles tort law rather than criminal law in the national legal system."¹² It was only in the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance of 1923 that the prospective parties were to "solemnly declare that aggressive war is an international crime,"¹³ thus making explicit what Article 16 of the Covenant only implied. To be sure, the Draft Treaty never became positive international law. But the idea remained alive that, for all practical purposes, aggressive war ought to be considered a crime, and that the task of an international agency called upon to deal with aggression was accordingly a function pertaining somehow to international criminal justice rather than to diplomacy. The definition of international aggression was to be the legal instrument for giving expression and effect to what one may call the penal conception of collective security.

The definition of aggression is formally an implementation of the first fundamental principle of collective security—the prohibition of force—in so far as it circumscribes the acts that fall under this prohibition. Its practical purpose, however, is to secure the prompt and effective operation of the mechanism of collective repressive measures by which that principle, or rather its observance, is guaranteed.

Aggression has always been one of the vaguest and most controversial concepts in the political and legal vocabulary. Accord-

¹² Philip C. Jessup, *A Modern Law of Nations* (New York 1948) p. 10. See also Erich Hula, "The Revival of the Idea of Punitive War," in *Thought*, vol. 21, no. 82 (September 1946) pp. 408 ff.

¹³ League of Nations, *Records of the Fourth Assembly, Minutes of the Third Committee (Official Journal)*, Special Supplement No. 16, p. 203.

ing to the proponents of definition, it is this general uncertainty regarding the facts constituting acts of aggression which accounts to a large extent for the practical weakness of the system of collective security. The lack of agreement on the meaning of aggression, they maintain, enables the aggressor to present with some semblance of justification offensive acts as legitimate measures of self-defense. What is even more unfortunate, the vagueness of the notion of aggression is apt to tempt the international agency itself, charged to deal with aggression, to evade taking collective action. Finally, and not least important, it is an inducement for the members of the security organization to shirk the obligations that are incumbent upon them pursuant to the principle of mutual assistance.

The remedy for the uncertainty concerning the nature of aggression and its untoward effect of weakening the deterrent power of the system of collective security is, we are told, a precise and legally binding definition of aggression. Once any doubt as to what facts constitute aggression has been removed by a clear definition of aggression, there will no longer be any room for disagreement on whether or not a particular act charged against a particular state qualifies as aggression. At the same time, the definition of aggression would allegedly dispose of the thorny question of what constitutes legitimate self-defense, by implicitly restricting the latter to the use of force in response to acts falling under that definition. All the international agency called upon to deal with aggression would have to do in a concrete case of armed conflict is determine which state actually committed the act defined as aggression. When this determination had been made, there would automatically be against the author of that act an irrefutable presumption of aggression,¹⁴ binding upon both the organ and the several members of the security organization. The definition of aggression would thus make it impossible for them to disre-

¹⁴ See League of Nations, *Collective Security* (cited above, note 5) p. 297. The present discussion on the definition of aggression leans heavily on the analysis in this volume.

gard the obligations imposed by the system of collective security. Moreover, the definition would supposedly alleviate the responsibility they assume in executing repressive measures against the aggressor state. Being deprived of free discretion in deciding whether the alleged act constitutes aggression, they cannot be held liable by the aggressor or any other state for considering and treating the act as what it is legally defined to be.¹⁵ In other words, the definition of aggression would not only secure the automatic operation of the system of collective security, but also lend it the impersonal character that marks the enforcement of objective rules of law in the national legal system.

But if the adherents of this school of thought agree on the desirability of defining aggression, they differ among themselves on the type of definition they want to see adopted. The discussion has turned chiefly on the alleged respective merits and demerits of the general and the so-called enumerative definition. Those who advocate the former content themselves with defining aggression as employment of force for any purpose other than self-defense. This definition is quite obviously a naive and futile attempt to define the vague and controversial concept of aggression by the no less vague and controversial notion of self-defense, and is virtually nothing more than a useless repetition of the rule prohibiting the resort to force (*Question*, pars. 242-44, 478). It is therefore hardly surprising that the discussion has from an early date centered on the enumerative type of definition which, being more elaborate and precise, can more reasonably be expected to serve the ends for which definition of aggression is recommended.

The most famous example of the enumerative type is the so-called Politis definition in Article 1 of the stillborn "Act relating to the Definition of the Aggressor," drafted by a committee under Nicolas Politis' chairmanship at the Disarmament Conference of

¹⁵ League of Nations, *Report of the Committee on Security Questions. Rapporteur: M. N. Politis*, Geneva, May 24, 1933, Conf. D./C.G. 108, in *Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments. Conference Documents*, vol. 2, League of Nations Document 1935, IX-4, pp. 679 ff. (par. 8). See also C. A. Pompe, *Aggressive War an International Crime* (The Hague 1953) pp. 88 ff.

Geneva in 1933. The Politis definition was, in turn, based on a proposal the Soviet Union had submitted to the Conference. Both of these proposed definitions have decisively and lastingly influenced subsequent discussions on the definition of aggression prior to and even since World War II.

According to the Politis definition, "the aggressor in an international conflict shall . . . be considered to be that State which is the first to commit any of the following actions: (1) Declaration of war upon another State; (2) Invasion by its armed forces, with or without a declaration of war, of the territory of another State; (3) Attack by its land, naval or air forces, with or without a declaration of war, on the territory, vessels or aircraft of another State; (4) Naval blockade of the coasts or ports of another State; (5) Provision of support to armed bands formed in the territory which have invaded the territory of another State, or refusal, notwithstanding the request of the invaded State, to take in its own territory all the measures in its power to deprive those bands of all assistance or protection."¹⁶

Granting the validity of the assumptions and considerations on which the demand for a definition of aggression is based, there can be no doubt that the Politis formula, or any other formula of the same pattern, is more suitable than a general definition for dispelling the nebulous vagueness in which the notion of aggression has so far been shrouded. Being an exhaustive enumeration of the facts that constitute acts of aggression, the Politis formula can be and has been criticized for forestalling the legal possibility of qualifying and treating other unforeseen and unforeseeable breaches of the peace as acts of aggression, a possibility that is claimed to be the very merit of a general definition. But the apostles of the Politis formula, even if they should concede that this limitation, inherent in any enumerative definition of aggression, is indeed the vice of its virtue, are convinced that the practical significance of this vice is as small as the practical significance

¹⁶ League of Nations, *Report . . . on Security Questions* (cited above, note 15) p. 683.

of the virtue of enumeration is great. The historical record of the system of collective security being what it is, its operation, they believe, is more likely to be hamstrung by deliberate evasion of vaguely stipulated obligations than by lack of legal authority to take and execute collective action.

The proponents of the Politis formula not only claim for it the merit of excluding for the future any doubt as to whether or not a concrete act alleged to be aggression actually constitutes aggression in the legal sense. They also praise the proposed definition as a means of simplifying the ascertainment of the responsibility for an armed conflict. All that is required in determining the aggressor is to establish which of the parties to the conflict has first committed one of the acts specified in the definition.¹⁷ Once such a definition as is suggested by Politis and his followers is adopted, "it is no longer necessary to inquire into the psychological motives behind the resort to force, the righteous or unrighteous intention of the State committing the forbidden act" (*Collective Security*, p. 304). Nor is it necessary for the international agency dealing with aggression to consider any of the events prior to the act of aggression, since the definition of aggression covers provoked acts of aggression no less than unprovoked acts (*ibid.*, pp. 23, 297).

As a matter of fact, the definition, being an implementation of the absolute prohibition of force, is deliberately intended to rule out even the consideration by the security organization of any but the objective facts of aggression. In the words of Article 2 of the "Act relating to the Definition of the Aggressor," drafted by the Politis committee in 1933, "no political, military, economic or other consideration may serve as an excuse or justification for the aggression" (*Question*, par. 78). Like the absolute prohibition of force, the definition of aggression is meant to give legal effect to the idea that "it is of paramount importance that peace be maintained, whatever may be the wrongs endured by the State which has attacked" (*Collective Security*, p. 298). Nothing is more

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 679.

revealing for the philosophy underlying the Politis definition than the contention of at least some of its adherents that the invasion of the territory of a state qualifies as aggression even when the attacked state possesses no legal title to exercise authority over the invaded territory, but holds it only de facto (*ibid.*, p. 316). The unqualified protection of the peace and the status quo is the fundamental purpose of the definition of aggression, as it is also of the absolute prohibition of force.

To be sure, the separation of the responsibility for aggression proper from the responsibility for the dispute or the situation that has led to the breach of the peace is in no way intended to bar a state whose rights and interests have been violated from taking all appropriate measures for safeguarding them. It is meant exclusively to limit the aggrieved state to recourse to methods of peaceful settlement and adjustment of its claims and grievances. "Domestic law does not allow the individual to take the law into his own hands by violent means. The same principle should be followed in the international field" (*ibid.*, p. 298). As aggressive self-help by means of force has always been a crime under domestic criminal law, it is henceforth also to be a crime under international criminal law.

III

One cannot but admire the logical consistency with which the Politis school tries to apply principles that govern social relations within the national community to the broader community of nations. But it is precisely on account of the extreme length to which this school is driven by its abstract reasoning that the fallacy of the analogy between relations among individuals and relations among collective political entities is in this case even more obvious and dangerous than it is in other twentieth-century legal schemes for organizing international society on the basis of this analogy.

Realization of the fallacy underlying the penal conception of

collective security is what distinguishes the school that denies the desirability of defining aggression from the school that upholds it. To be sure, aggressive war is a matter of deep moral concern for the opponents of definition, no less than for its proponents. Nevertheless they refuse to accept the conclusion that ideas, principles, and procedures of criminal justice offer the best means of fighting the evil of war. They oppose to the penal conception of collective security what one may call the diplomatic conception.

Criticism of the Politis school is based on several grounds. It is, first of all, directed against the validity of the assumption that definition would ensure the deterrent effect which the system of collective security is intended to exert upon potential aggressors. This expectation, according to the adherents of the diplomatic conception, is too unrealistic to be warranted. What actually renders it doubtful whether aggression against a particular state is going to provoke the reaction and resistance of the entire international community is that states cannot reasonably be relied upon "to make war against nature," that is, for reasons they do not hold to affect their national interests (Francesco Coppola in *Collective Security*, pp. 7, 144 ff.). It is true that the definition of aggression might deprive the security organization and its members of the argument that an act of aggression actually committed did not legally qualify as such; and in this case they might find it more difficult, if they refused in a concrete case of aggression to take collective action, to justify their policy in terms of the legal obligations they have subscribed to. But it is somewhat naive, the diplomatic school maintains, to assume that they will not try, and will not be able, to overcome this difficulty, if considerations of interest seem to advise against accepting the risks and burdens involved in collective action. Moreover, while the definition of aggression is apt to preclude for the future any honest disagreement among governments on whether or not a specific act constitutes aggression in the legal sense of the term, it does not and cannot provide for the automatic ascertainment of the responsi-

bility for having committed it. There still remains the possibility of honest, and even more commonly of dishonest, disagreement on the matter of which of the parties to the conflict first committed one of the acts of aggression specified in the definition (see *Question*, par. 33).

But lack of realistic appreciation of the political factors that render doubtful any attempt to devise a fool-proof mechanism of collective security has not been the only objection against the proposal of definition. The representatives of the diplomatic school have for moral, no less than political, reasons questioned also the validity and the wisdom of the philosophy itself on which the proposal is based. More specifically, they have questioned the moral validity and the political wisdom of the ideal of automatic sanctions in the first place, and of the punitive ideal in the second.

IV

The great merit of definition, according to the penal school, is that it would make it simpler, when hostilities break out, to determine aggression and aggressor. But even if this effect is assumed to be as striking as alleged, one may very well doubt whether the attempt to resolve the complexity of international war into the elements of an ordinary criminal case is justified. As things actually are, the method of applying to war the principles and means of criminal justice cannot but assure "a purely artificial simplicity" (*Question*, par. 229).

As a matter of fact, the Politis definition is intended to reduce the crime of aggression to a degree of simplicity at which, as a rule, even municipal criminal codes do not aim in defining ordinary offenses. According to a time-honored maxim of criminal law, *Mens Rea* usually forms a constituent part of crime. An individual therefore is commonly not guilty of an offense against the criminal law unless he has a guilty mind.¹⁸ No guilty mind

¹⁸ For a recent discussion of the concept see J. LL. J. Edwards, *Mens Rea in Statutory Offences* (London 1955).

is required for committing the crime of aggression, as far as the Politis definition is concerned. Intention, motive, and purpose of the act of aggression need not—indeed, must not—be inquired into by the international agency when faced with aggression (*Collective Security*, pp. 337 ff.). Any resort to force, provided only that it falls under the enumeration of objective facts that constitute aggression, calls for the immediate taking of collective action against the state committing aggression in the defined sense, even if the aggressive act was in no way intended to initiate an aggressive war, and even if the parties to the armed conflict resulting from that act merely stumbled, as it were, into what Sir Austen Chamberlain and others have described as “accidental war.” Thus, the diplomatic school charges, the definition of aggression might very well have the effect of precipitating a collective action where there is a reasonable chance to stop aggressive acts and restore peace and the status quo ante without resort to the most extreme and calamitous measures (see *Question*, pars. 40 ff., 51, 116, 260).

Admittedly, accidental wars, as opposed to deliberate wars, may have occurred in history less frequently than a naive philosophy of international politics has been inclined to assume. But there have in the past been wars that fit Sir Austen’s description of accidental wars, and there still is and always will be the possibility of “wars arising without premeditation, without the desire for war on the part of anyone, out of some question which suddenly brings passions to the boiling point, which affects, or is thought to affect, the national honor, or out of some imbroglio into which nations have been led, not knowing what they did, and from which they see no possibility of extracting themselves without a loss of honor and repute” (*Collective Security*, p. 35). No doubt, such a war as Sir Austen has so described offers to a security organization an ideal opportunity for proving itself true to its task of composing conflicts and restoring peace. But there is even less doubt that by premature application of coercive punitive

measures against one of the parties to the conflict the organization would deprive itself of any chance of exploiting that opportunity successfully. The criminal prosecutor would from the very beginning crowd out the *amiable compositeur*, and a particular war, capable of being ended easily by pacific procedures, would unnecessarily and unjustifiedly be transformed into a general war infinitely more difficult of termination.

The diplomatic school's criticism that the vaunted simplicity of the proposed definition fails to take into account the "tangled political situation" (*ibid.*, p. 308) and the no less tangled moral situation in which wars usually originate applies not only to accidental wars. Also in deliberate, premeditated war the responsibility for committing aggression, in the military-technical sense of the definition, is likely to be only one element, though undoubtedly a very important one, in a composite pattern of moral and political responsibilities for the conflict which has exploded into war. To put it in the blunt words of a Swedish statesman, Mr. Osten Unden: "It has been contended that the relationship between the attacking country and the defending country is similar to the relationship between a murderer or bandit on the one hand and his victim on the other. Such a concept, however, has nothing in common with the type of situation that most frequently arises. In reality there are numerous degrees of responsibility in the case of aggression" (see *Question*, par. 232).

The usual complexity of the pattern of responsibilities in deliberate, premeditated wars of aggression is impressively suggested by the way in which both history and jurisprudence have commonly approached the question of war guilt. As far back as Thucydides, historians concerned with the interconnection of events and their explanation have tended to regard the "immediate cause" plunging states into war as a subordinate question compared with the "real cause," which, according to the great Athenian, is also the one that is "formally most kept out of sight." Concentrating their attention on the latter, the historians, again following Thucydides, are inclined to consider and describe as

"inevitable" the war whose origin they thus try to explain.¹⁹ Seeing the parties involved in war as instruments of fate or of irrepressible causal forces, rather than as free agents, they even tend to exculpate them from moral and legal guilt.

In the traditional doctrine of international law, as it prevailed prior to the first world war, there was a similar tendency to look upon war as a natural phenomenon, as it were, outside the reach of moral and legal norms, or, what is practically the reverse of this naturalistic conception, to admit, explicitly or implicitly, an absolute right to war. But in so far as that doctrine did retain the normative character of the *bellum justum* theory of the schoolmen and recognized only a qualified right to war, it displayed—in weighing and balancing against one another the "numerous degrees of responsibility in the case of aggression"—a distinct tendency to emphasize the responsibility for the remote causes of war rather than for the opening of armed hostilities, the proximate cause. According to the *bellum justum* doctrine, it was not aggression per se, but the lack of valid cause in launching war that constituted war guilt.²⁰

To eliminate any legal justification for starting war is the very purpose of the absolute prohibition of force achieved by twentieth-century international law. Indeed, the fact that under traditional international law each state could claim the right to decide for itself the validity of the cause for which it resorted to war invited an attempt to prevent any further abuse in the exercise of the *jus ad bellum* by abolishing the right as such. But however weighty the arguments for the outlawry of war may be, it cannot reasonably be expected that the situations in which aggressions

¹⁹ Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, Modern Library ed. (New York 1951) p. 15. See the interesting discussion on guilt and culpability in politics in the work of a contemporary historian, Herbert Butterfield, *Christianity, Diplomacy and War* (London 1953) pp. 41 ff. and passim. The same author, in *History and Human Relations* (New York 1952), devotes a special chapter to the problem of "moral judgments in history" (pp. 101 ff.).

²⁰ The best survey and analysis of the doctrine of war prior to World War I can be found in Leo Strisower, *Der Krieg und die Völkerrechtsordnung* (Vienna 1919).

occur will henceforth be any less complex, morally or politically, than they were prior to the legal prohibition of force. Nor can it reasonably be taken for granted that a collective-security organization should not be entitled carefully to balance the rights and wrongs on both sides when dealing with acts of aggression. It is for these reasons that the advocates of the diplomatic conception of collective security oppose a definition of aggression that ignores the usual complexity of the context in which wars, including deliberate aggressive wars, originate, and prevents the international authorities, charged with the task of halting them, from taking that complexity adequately into account.

The case of provoked aggression is undoubtedly the strongest argument on which the diplomatic school can base its warnings against artificial simplicity and its plea for the recognition of divided responsibility for armed conflict. Moreover, use of the idea of provocation as a qualifying element in the determination of war guilt is sanctioned by long-established practice in international law. Time and again, treaties of defensive alliance have limited the obligation of their respective parties to assist one another to cases in which they are the innocent victim of "an unprovoked attack," "an unprovoked war," or "an unprovoked aggression" (see *Question*, pars. 202 ff.).

The members of the diplomatic school do not feel that their plea for the recognition of divided responsibility in cases of provoked aggression is any less well justified because it has proved to be as difficult to define provocation in precise legal terms as it is to define aggression or self-defense. They want to see international authorities, when called upon to deal with breaches of the peace, as little shackled by a definition of provocation as by a definition of aggression. All they insist upon is that "the previous conduct of the attacked party"²¹ be one of the factors those authorities should be free to take into consideration when deciding on and carrying out collective action against aggression. From this point of view, three categories of acts that might constitute

²¹ Pompe (cited above, note 15) p. 49.

provocation, depending upon the individual case, have been mentioned in the course of the discussion on the definition of aggression: first, preparations for aggression at some time in the near or distant future; second, some breach of international law, involving another state or its nationals; and third, an unfriendly attitude of governments or public opinion, even if not a breach of international law (see *Question*, par. 338).

According to the representatives of the diplomatic school, there are still other factors to be taken into account in measuring the responsibilities for a war. The Politis formula is practically "a territorial definition of aggression" (*Collective Security*, p. 316). As such it covers the territory which a state holds only *de facto* no less than the territory it holds *de jure*. In terms of this definition it therefore makes no difference whether territory of the one or the other kind is invaded. Moreover, the definition applies to any case of aggression, regardless of whether the territorial sovereignties of the aggressor state and the attacked state are clearly marked off by a boundary line that is definitely established in law as well as in fact (*ibid.*, pp. 300, 334 ff.). To be sure, the prohibition of force is meant to be absolute. Thus the aggressor state has no legal right to claim justifying causes of one type or another in the sense of making its acts lawful. But it may very well be maintained that the aggressor's moral and political responsibility does not weigh so heavily when the aggression is committed in an unsettled state of affairs as it does when occurring within a politically and legally stable order.

v

By emphasizing the moral and political complexity of the situation in which wars usually originate, and stressing the usually "numerous degrees of responsibility in the case of aggression," the diplomatic school exposes itself to the suspicion that it is trying to restore by indirect means the right to war to the extent that it was generally recognized prior to the absolute prohibition of force. But to infer this intention from the position of the

diplomatic school is in no way justified. It would be equally unwarranted to interpret its rejection of the ideal of automatic sanctions, and the stubbornness with which it insists on reserving to the security organization liberty of action in dealing with aggression, as inspired by the motive of preserving for the organization unbounded legal freedom to evade the task of taking collective action whenever it pleases to do so.²² After all, the members of the diplomatic school object to the definition of aggression not only in so far as it would imply a legal obligation to resort to enforcement measures even in cases where for political or other reasons the latter could and should be avoided. They oppose definition no less sincerely on the ground that it might legally forestall collective action in cases where it ought to be taken. All the same, it would be useless to deny that free discretion of the security organization in dealing with aggression is apt to operate in practice as a legal temptation to escape the commitments of collective security.

But whatever the consequences of liberty of action on the part of the security organization might be, they do not diminish the weight of the moral objections to which the idea of automatic sanctions is open. To establish or imply an obligation on the part of the security organization and its members to take the most extreme measures in cases of aggression, including measures of military force, irrespective of the attacked state's own previous conduct or of other factors relevant to the question of war guilt, would mean subscribing unquestioningly to an absolute general guarantee of protection. Even if guilty of the most serious infringements of international law against the aggressor, the attacked state would be disposed to count on, even to feel justified in expecting, international support against suffering the not altogether undeserved consequences of its own unlawful deeds. In fact, the encouragement of such an expectation might easily

²² An example of such interpretation can be found in Jean Ray, *Commentaire du Pacte de la Société des Nations selon la politique et la jurisprudence des organes de la Société* (Paris 1930) pp. 534 ff.

operate as an inducement to lawless conduct, inasmuch as by indulging therein nations would run only a greatly reduced risk of war.²³

The moral implications of a system of automatic sanctions are no less objectionable and absurd from the point of view of the security organization and its members. Opposition to the idea of collective security has often been stated in terms that make it appear to be the expression of a philosophy of power politics pure and simple, unconcerned with considerations of morality and justice. Indeed, when Francesco Coppola (*Collective Security*, pp. 7, 144 ff.) ridicules the prohibition of force in international politics as an attempt to prevent the states from making war according to nature, that is, for their own national interests, he not only seems to suggest the probable futility of what he considers a dubious legalistic effort. His dictum also recalls the notion, recurring time and again in the history of political thought ever since the days of the sophists, that might ought to be the standard of right.²⁴ Similarly, when he refers ironically to the obligation which a security organization imposes upon its members to assist the victim of aggression as an obligation to make war against nature, inasmuch as such obligation does not accord with their national interests, he again seems to voice doubts not

²³ The Protocol that was to be annexed to the "Act relating to the Definition of the Aggressor," drafted under Mr. Politis' chairmanship by the Committee on Security Questions of the Disarmament Conference held in 1933, implicitly recognized the danger involved in ruling out the consideration of justifying causes. The list exemplifying such causes was followed by the provision: "The High Contracting Parties further agree to recognize that the present Protocol can never legitimate any violation of international law that may be implied in the circumstances comprised in the above list": League of Nations, *Report . . . on Security Questions* (cited above, note 15) p. 684. See the similar provision in the concluding paragraph of the Annex to the USSR Conventions for the Definition of Aggression, signed at London on July 3, 1933, in League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. CXLVII (1934) p. 75.

²⁴ The sophist Antiphon mentioned among the human conventions enjoining us to do things that are unnatural the laws bidding us never to be aggressors against our neighbors, but at the most to defend ourselves against their aggressions: see Ernest Barker, *Greek Political Theory. Plato and his Predecessors*, 3rd ed. (London 1947) pp. 66 ff.

only about the effectiveness of this legal prescription but about the very validity of the moral principle of mutual aid underlying it. Admittedly, the diplomatic school shares with Coppola and other opponents of the system of collective security a doubt in the unfailing efficacy of its devices. Even so, its rejection of the proposal to bind an international organization by a legal definition of aggression that would not permit it to consider duly all pertinent responsibilities, when dealing with a breach of the peace, is in no wise caused by a lack of concern for the moral duties of international fellowship.

Far from conceiving of the obligation of assistance as a human convention of contestable validity, because it contradicts nature's law that each state should seek exclusively its own advantage and comfort, the diplomatic school merely insists, for moral reasons, on the conditional character of the duty of mutual assistance. If an attacked state is not morally entitled to expect the support of the international community, irrespective of its own previous conduct, neither can the security organization and its members be justly held bound by an obligation to risk the dire contingency of collective action for the purpose of assisting the object of aggression, regardless of the actual balance of rights and wrongs among the warring states. Indeed, it appears that even Mr. Politis was not completely blind to the morally preposterous implications of his own proposition. At any rate, he was anxious to disprove that an absolute obligation to take sanctions could be legitimately deduced from it.²⁵

In sum, the ideal of automatic sanctions which inspired the

²⁵ "It should . . . be noted," said Politis in his report of 1933, "that the question of the definition of the aggressor and that of sanctions to be taken against the aggressor while, of course, closely connected, are nevertheless separate questions. The strictness of the definition of the aggressor does not necessarily lead to the automatic application of sanctions": *League of Nations, Report . . . on Security Questions* (cited above, note 15) p. 679. More consistent with the basic philosophy of definition of aggression is the statement by another of its representatives, to the effect that "the automatic application of collective sanctions in cases of aggression was essential": *Question of Defining Aggression* (cited above, note 2) par. 267. On this question see also *Collective Security* (cited above, note 5) p. 315, note 2.

proposal to define aggression is, in the first place, a phantom, unrealistic by virtue of the assumption that a legal formula will ensure to the system of collective security a deterrent effect upon potential aggressors which it can for political reasons never be expected to have. In the second place, the ideal is open to the most serious objections on moral grounds. Since the simplicity to which the proponents of definition try to reduce the problem of war is "purely artificial," it is not surprising that the proposed solution, based on such artificiality, is contestable in ethical terms as well. Oversimplification of complex moral problems cannot but lead to morally objectionable solutions.

The advocacy of a definition of aggression is nevertheless not wholly lacking in merit. Inasmuch as the discussion it has provoked has brought out in full relief the morally doubtful nature of the ideal of automatic sanctions, it has contributed to the elucidation of a central problem of collective security. Ever since the system was proposed and applied, its advocates have been obsessed with the quest for the certainty of sanctions. Definition of aggression is only one among various devices that have in the course of the last forty years been recommended for assuring that certainty. If it is the merit of such political realists as Coppola and Morgenthau²⁶ to have proved the political fallacy of this frantic quest for certainty, it is the merit of the proponents of definition—in view of their real intentions, an entirely involuntary merit, to be sure—to have carried its advocacy to a point where also the moral fallacy of the quest becomes obvious. The ideal of *automatic* collective sanctions against aggression is a false ideal, politically and morally.

VI

The representatives of the diplomatic school have not only questioned the moral validity and the political wisdom of the ideal

²⁶ Coppola's position has already been cited: *Collective Security*, pp. 7, 144 ff. Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (New York 1954), discusses collective security on pp. 274 ff. and 388 ff.

of automatic sanctions. Their criticism of the philosophy underlying the proposal to define aggression has been directed also against the punitive ideal, which forms no less an essential part of that philosophy than the notion of automatic sanctions.

The qualification of aggression as an international criminal offense is intended to serve the same purpose as is the automatic operation of sanctions. The prospective condemnation of an aggressor as an international criminal by the competent international authority is meant to exert, and even expected to intensify, the deterrent effect upon potential aggressors which the certain prospect of collective action in case of aggression is designed and assumed to have. As an alleged means of preventing war, the conception of aggression as a criminal act, subject to criminal punishment by the organized international community, is therefore open to the same criticism of lack of realistic assumptions as the idea of automatic sanctions itself, and has been subjected to this criticism by those who adhere to the conceptions of the diplomatic school.

Doubting the efficacy of the punitive notion as a means of preventing war, the adherents of the diplomatic school hold it the more important and urgent to concern themselves with the question what effect the penal conception is likely to have upon collective action taken for repressing war, once open hostilities have broken out. How, they ask, is the substitution of the idea of collective retribution for the idea of mutual assistance going to influence collective security *in action*? The objections to the penal conception raised by the diplomatic school from this point of view retain their full interest and value in spite of the fact that no definition of aggression and no express designation of the latter as a criminal offense has ever been incorporated either into general international law or into the law of the League of Nations or of the United Nations. Collective action in case of aggression is, for political reasons, as apt to be turned to punitive objectives, even without any rules of positive law to legitimize

them, as punitive war has tended in the twentieth century to be revived without such sanction.

It would seem, in the first place, that the cognizance of aggression, conceived of as an international crime, ought to be given to an international judicial tribunal of one kind or another. The most elementary principles of criminal justice practiced by civilized nations require that independent courts alone conduct criminal proceedings, that they discharge their penal functions without paying attention to political considerations, and that they comply most strictly with evidential and other rules safeguarding objective procedures. These principles are essential requirements of international no less than of municipal criminal justice. To advocate, as some proponents of the penal conception of collective security have been doing, that the power of passing judgment on the guilt of the crime of aggression be assigned not to a political but to a judicial authority is therefore only consistent and fair. It is hardly surprising, however, that most of the members of the penal school have rejected the idea of having the responsibility for aggression determined by judicial agencies and procedures. "In theory," to quote Professor René Cassin (in *Collective Security*, p. 331), "this is a magnificent plan. But we feel that it does not correspond to reality." One may wonder indeed that the learned author does not go a step further and draw from his realization of the inapplicability of criminal procedures proper to the reality of international war the conclusion that the penal notion is altogether out of place. Yet one cannot but agree with his view that only a political organ is capable of dealing adequately with the problems to which aggression gives rise.

In cases of aggression, what precludes resort to a judicial authority is, first of all, the momentous and far-reaching consequences of a decision to take collective action for halting hostilities and restoring peace. Whatever punishment a municipal court inflicts upon a murderer or bandit, the execution of that punishment will most likely not directly affect the national community

as such. To punish an aggressor state by taking collective military action against it may very well shake the entire international community to its foundation. The implications and possible consequences of the judgment to be passed in the case of aggression thus rule out the possibility of ever basing the decision on purely legal considerations without examining and weighing the political aspects and factors involved in the case. Only a political organ, therefore, can be expected to be equal to the task.

Nor does the nature of the case make it permissible to bind the international authority dealing with aggression by rules of evidence and other rules guaranteeing objective procedures, such as the most fundamental principles of criminal justice would require, if punishment of the aggressor rather than halting aggression and restoring the status quo ante is the very purpose of collective action. The success of the latter could easily depend upon an instantaneous response to the aggression committed, and this not only for reasons of the character of twentieth-century warfare (*Collective Security*, p. 315). Even in less urgent cases, circumstances might call for taking collective action at a moment when the available evidence for establishing which of the parties to the armed conflict first perpetrated the act of aggression is at best presumptive, and by no means conclusive. Thus compliance with procedural principles that are indispensable for rendering objective criminal justice would very likely delay the operation of sanctions, and accordingly defeat the purpose that the penal conception of collective security is intended to serve.

Its advocates, faced with this awkward dilemma, are, for the most part, not ready to pay so high a price, but insist rather on the pursuit of punitive objectives by purely political agencies and procedures. It is true, an attempt to fight aggression by collective action decided upon in judicial proceedings would no doubt be doomed to failure, the reality being what it is. Nevertheless it would indeed be a magnificent and noble attempt, inasmuch as it is inspired by the aim of extending the rule of law. But to fight aggression by collective punitive action decided

upon in political proceedings cannot but result in extending the rule of force rather than that of law, for collective action in pursuit of punitive purposes is bound to make more difficult both the termination of the action and the settlement of the issues that have caused the armed conflict. Thus the eventuality of collective action against aggression becomes still more dreadful than it already unavoidably is. This effect of the penal conception upon collective security in action is the point on which the diplomatic school has concentrated its criticism of the punitive philosophy.

It would be naive, not to say preposterous, to suggest that an international agency called upon to deal with aggression should, in all circumstances, subordinate its enforcement policy to conciliatory efforts, with a view to ending the armed conflict at any price and thus also shortening the collective action. Rather, one would be entitled to insist that it concentrate wholly on repression and suspend any attempts at conciliation if, and as long as, the military superiority of the aggressor state over the attacked state is so overwhelming as to assure the former an easy and quick victory, enabling it to impose its political will upon the defeated party. For an unimpeded military triumph of the aggressor over his victim might very well make any conciliatory efforts purely "academic."²⁷ But although the spirit of collective security could, under certain conditions and for their duration, require the subordination and even the outright suspension of conciliatory exertions, that spirit would be definitely violated if the peace organization, in pursuing repressive measures, were to neglect any reasonable chance of terminating the contest of arms by pacific procedures. The latter are no less, if indeed they are no more, than the former a legitimate means for attaining what is the object of collective security, if and when aggressive war has been launched: the restoration of peace.

It would be equally naive and preposterous to deny that the difficulty of pursuing at one and the same time a policy of repres-

²⁷ This argument played a decisive role in the Korean case. See U. N. Security Council, *Official Records*, 474th Meeting, June 27, 1950, p. 2.

sion and a policy aimed at conciliation and pacific settlement is indeed formidable, for political and also for military reasons. The task might easily prove too difficult for the skill of even the most consummate statesmen. Undoubtedly it becomes still more formidable if the international agency, in exercising its security function, assumes or is legally held to assume the role of a criminal or quasi-criminal prosecutor, judge, and executor, directing its efforts to the punishment of the aggressor.

As was mentioned above, the advocates of the penal conception have never gone so far as to pretend that the responsibility for committing aggression is necessarily identical with the responsibility for the dispute or the situation that finally exploded in armed hostilities and war. They reject, it is true, the recognition of causes that in the eyes of the law might justify an act of aggression, and therefore insist that, in dealing with aggression, the pertinent authority refuse to take allegedly justifying causes into consideration. But they do not rule out the possibility that the aggressor state could have well founded grievances against the attacked state "which might later be invoked" (*Collective Security*, pp. 332, 298). In other words, the attempt to simplify the determination of aggression and aggressor, in case of an outbreak of hostilities, is not meant to imply that the issues that have given rise to the armed conflict should be disregarded when it comes to its final settlement. One is entitled to wonder, however, whether any agency, once it has become engaged in punitive procedures against the aggressor state alone, will ever find its way back to a full and objective appreciation of the complex political and legal context of which the aggression forms only one element. And one may wonder still more whether the aggressor state will ever be ready to accept its prosecutor as an authority morally, legally, and psychologically fit to determine objectively what is its due.

The deliberate exclusive concentration on the crime of aggression, the "immediate cause" of the armed conflict, cannot but result, in the first place, in the obliteration of the political factors

that have been its "real causes." This obliteration is a classic example of what Morgenthau has called the "fragmentation" of international issues. "The facts of life to be dealt with," he says,²⁸ "are artificially separated from the facts that precede, accompany, and follow them, and are transformed into a legal 'case.'" The extent to which this transformation of an intricate and involved political question or set of questions into an apparently simple criminal case is bound to complicate and delay the settlement of the former can hardly be overrated.

This effect will necessarily be the more powerful as the exclusive concentration on the legal case of aggression results, in the second place, in the obliteration of its wider legal and moral aspects as well. The attacked state may itself be guilty of violations of law and morality so serious as to qualify as international crimes. But the proceedings directed against the criminal aggressor to the exclusion of any other malefactor give the victim of aggression the chance to emerge as a shining example of innocence and probity. Right and justice will be proclaimed to be all on its side, and none on the side of the aggressor. No sooner has a collective action aimed at the punishment of the aggressor been initiated than it automatically becomes a collective war for righteousness, with all the consequences we know from the history of individual wars for righteousness.²⁹ Passions are inflamed; the temptation to resort to the sternest methods of warfare is increased; and complete victory over one culprit, rather than the halting of aggression and restoration of peace between two guilty parties, becomes the objective of the collective action.³⁰ Moreover, with the shifting and widening of the goal of such action, and the consequential lengthening of its duration, new political compli-

²⁸ Morgenthau (cited above, note 26) pp. 523 ff.

²⁹ See Butterfield, *Christianity, Diplomacy and War* (cited above, note 19) p. 17 and passim.

³⁰ Vattel's classic statement on the characteristics and effects of a war for righteousness is applicable also to punitive collective action. See E. de Vattel, *Le droit des gens, ou principes de la loi naturelle, appliqués à la conduite et aux affaires des nations et souverains*, trans. in *Classics of International Law* (Washington 1916) bk. III, ch. XII, p. 304, par. 188.

cations are bound to arise that will add to the original hazards of the collective action and may even endanger its ultimate success.

VII

In the course of discussion on the fundamentals of collective security, probably the most consistent and most radical proposal that has been made with a view to avoiding the pitfalls of the punitive approach is the scheme promoted in the 1930s by Dr. Georg Cohn, a Danish scholar and statesman.³¹

Reciprocal undertakings of military assistance form an essential part of the system of collective security, as well as of the system of defensive alliance. The two devices differ from one another, however, in that the alliance is intended to guarantee the security of a limited number of states against the supposedly aggressive policy of one or more particular states, while the collective organization of security is designed to protect the security of all against each and every other state. The system of alliance "is necessarily directed against someone, even if it is completely free from any thought of aggression," but the collective organization of security is directed against war as such (*Collective Security*, pp. 161 ff.). It is the abstract character of the system of collective security, as opposed to the concrete nature of the system of alliance, that renders the effectiveness of the former so much more doubtful than that of the latter in the eyes of Coppola and others.

Cohn sees in the abstract character of collective security not a vice but a virtue, and tries to preserve that character for it even throughout the collective action which the security organization resorts to when hostilities have broken out. According to Cohn, the collective action must be taken not against aggression, and even less against the aggressor, but "against war as such, as fact"—defensive as well as offensive war. For "to direct the reaction . . .

³¹ The following references in the text to Georg Cohn's scheme are based on League of Nations, *Collective Security* (cited above, note 5) pp. 22 ff., 402 ff. See also Georg Cohn, *Neo-Neutrality*, transl. by Arthur S. Keller and Einar Jensen (New York 1939), especially pp. 294 ff.

against the guilty party and in the interest of the victim" would mean that the organized international society "becomes active against someone and no longer merely against war itself."

This principle that the enforcement measures are to be taken not against the aggressor, but against both or all belligerent states, is not the only indication of Cohn's effort to prevent the collective action from turning into a war proper that will, as such, be no more easily limited and terminated just because it is being waged by collective society. Though the members of the security organization are, under Cohn's scheme, legally held to participate in the enforcement measures according to directives of its central agency, their status is conceived by him in terms of neutrality, rather than of belligerency. To be sure, unlike the neutrals of former times, they are bound by the rule of participation, rather than that of abstention. But the principles of traditional neutrality would apply to them, inasmuch as they are expected, while engaged in enforcement measures, to maintain absolute impartiality toward the belligerents and to keep the balance between them rather than assist in the defeat of the one by the other. The elimination of the question of legal and moral responsibility for the immediate as well as for the real causes of the armed conflict does not, according to Cohn, in any way weaken the system of collective security, but on the contrary is likely to render it "more and more effective and universal."

If Cohn's scheme is the most systematic elaboration of the anti-punitive notion of collective security, it is by no means the only expression of the opposition of the diplomatic school to the penal philosophy. Others of its members subscribe to fundamentally the same idea as that underlying Cohn's proposal, when they insist that the ideal attitude for an international authority to take in dealing with aggression is "that of a policeman in a street fight, who is completely unconcerned with the rights and wrongs of the quarrel, but determined to separate the combatants" (*Collective Security*, p. 139).

That the execution of sanctions or enforcement measures by

the collective society is essentially a police action, rather than war in the traditional sense of the word, is today common parlance, accepted and used by members of the penal, as well as of the diplomatic, school of collective security. In fact, during the last decades international and constitutional lawyers have been considering and discussing to what extent the rules concerning war proper are also applicable to collective police action. Important as it is, however, this question is not the only and not the chief concern of those who advocate what we have called the diplomatic conception of collective security. What they are primarily interested in is the question of the political principles and objectives that should guide an international organization and its members in taking and executing collective action, if and when the prohibition of force has been disregarded. And their answer is less that the collective action ought not be legally conceived as war than that it must not be politically waged as war.

Their question and answer are both determined by their realization of what a dreadful contingency a collective action conceived and conducted as a war of sanctions would be. To put it in the words of the student of collective security whose plea for the ideal of police action has just been quoted: "The true function of a collective system is rather that of a scarecrow than a gun; the principal benefits are forfeited when it breaks down as a deterrent and has to proceed to action, since this may involve a more disastrous collision than that which it is designed to prevent" (*Collective Security*, p. 139). It is with a view to mitigating the effects of such a collision, in case it cannot be avoided altogether, that the diplomatic school rejects not only the idea of collective retribution but, explicitly or implicitly, even that of collective assistance to be rendered to the victim of aggression, inasmuch as the latter would practically result in and justify a war of alliance against a particular state. Not only must the security organization not wage a punitive war; it must not wage any war in the proper sense of the word. Its only legitimate object in taking collective action is to separate the belligerents, and it must not

in the process become itself a belligerent in a political or legal sense. Only under these conditions will it remain acceptable and fit to act as a diplomatic conciliatory body as well as a peace-enforcing authority.

The diplomatic school doubts that the prospect of condemnation and punishment for aggression would prove an effective deterrent, and therefore reproaches the advocates of the penal conception of collective security with lack of realism. But one may wonder to what extent the idea of police action proper is itself a realistic proposition, considering the practical requirements of collective action and the psychological climate that is likely to prevail at the moment the action is called for. The analogy with simple social relations within the national community is as deceiving in this case as it is in other cases. If it is naive to assume that the international community can, as a rule, afford to deal with an aggressor state as if it were a murderer or bandit pure and simple, it is hardly less naive to expect that an armed conflict between two states is likely to be as easily manageable as a simple street brawl.

In the first place, whatever name be given to the collective action, to the extent that it is military action it is from the very beginning subject to military requirements of strategy and tactics, and becomes ever more so the longer it lasts. Its very termination is as much dependent upon military as upon political considerations. Moreover, unless the combatants display an equal degree of willingness or resistance about being separated, the international organization and its executive agency will sooner or later find themselves aligned, and thus practically allied, with one of the belligerents against the other. Assuming, as one is entitled to assume, that the aggressor state is less likely than its victim to comply with a cease-fire order issued by the community organ, the latter will be actually forced into the position it has conscientiously tried not to occupy by refraining from any judgment on the responsibility for aggression.

In the second place, an abandonment of the role of the police-

man, "completely unconcerned with the rights and wrongs of the quarrel," could be the very price to be paid for the possibility of initiating the collective action at all. The champions of the policeman ideal are themselves compelled to recognize that "at present such sublime detachment from the merits of a dispute is hard to find" (*Collective Security*, p. 139). Admittedly, this obstacle might be somewhat less formidable if there were an international police force in existence, and if therefore the members of the international organization would not have to become directly involved with their own military establishments in the collective action to be taken. But be that as it may, so long as no international police force exists, the policeman will actually be a composite military machinery to be set and sustained in motion exclusively by the national wills of its component parts. This being the case, is it then likely that the pallid abstract ideal of a mere police action against "war itself," rather than against any concrete enemy guilty of crime, will prove powerful enough to make nations agree to the sacrifice of their blood and treasure?

The question touches upon what is indeed the most paradoxical and tragic complexity in the system of collective security. One, and probably the most important, of the reasons that make the prevention of war in our age urgent and imperative is the character of modern warfare. To ascribe its wantonness and cruelty to the destructiveness of contemporary weapons would merely explain what makes the horrors technically possible, and would not state their real cause. The latter must be sought in those ideological and political factors which ended the brief period in Western history when wars came close to being fought like duels, and which gave new impetus to the idea and practice of war for righteousness. It would be surprising if actions of the collective society taken to repress armed conflict did not tend to be colored by the kind of war that unfortunately dominates in our time. But it is much more ominous that the peculiar conditions of collective action are fatally conducive to such action being initiated and conducted as punitive war, with all the calamitous conse-

quences it entails. Regardless of whether or not one subscribes to the dictum that the members of a security organization are called upon "to make war against nature," it can hardly be denied that, human nature being what it is, the motive power for their assuming the risks and burdens of participating in collective action is likely to stand in need of being reinforced by an appeal to such vindictive instincts as can be aroused only against a particular concrete *hostis*, allegedly guilty of an atrocious crime.

The members of the diplomatic school can perhaps be reproached with having underrated the extent to which their ideal of the policeman is at odds with the realities in which their scheme of collective action would necessarily operate. But this can in no way detract from their historical merit in having pointed out the direction in which our thinking on collective security should, for the sake of peace, be moving. Their merit is the greater in that they attacked the position of the penal school long before "that best oracle of wisdom, experience" taught us a lesson on the problems involved in collective security *in action*. The experience of both the League of Nations, including the sanctions experiment of 1935-36, and the United Nations up to June 25, 1950, tended to focus the attention of statesmen and scholars on the ways and means of increasing the chance of preventing war, rather than on the problems involved in repressing war by collective action. It was the United Nations action in Korea that first brought home to us the full significance of the latter question.

Professor Herbert Butterfield is inclined to see in the Korean war a notable exception to the current twentieth-century type of punitive war for righteousness and a return to "that warfare-for-limited-purposes which has been so despised since 1914."³² It is true, the Korean war did not end as a punitive war. But it would be hard to maintain that it did not begin as such, and that there were not strong forces at work also to terminate it as such. It is for this reason that the Korean war must be recorded in his-

³² Butterfield, *Christianity, Diplomacy and War* (cited above, note 19) pp. 16, 22.

tory as a dramatic contest between the advocates of the penal and those of the diplomatic conception of collective security. Indeed, the discussion inside and outside the United Nations from 1950 to 1953, and even afterward, on the methods by which and the objectives for which the collective action in Korea should have been conducted, were a repetition of the theoretical arguments and counterarguments exchanged in the discussions on the definition of aggression carried on in the twenties, thirties, and forties. It was, however, only in the course of this first experiment in military collective action that the proper objective of enforcement measures emerged as one of the paramount practical issues of collective security.

SCARCE MONEY

BY HANS NEISSER

“**S**CARCE MONEY,” that is, rising interest rates and more stringent credit conditions, is being held responsible for the current decline of residential building in this country, and for the impossibility of developing public construction projects to the desired extent, especially roads and school buildings. Also the investment projects of small business appear to be discriminated against, at a time when larger concerns are able to increase their investment activities.

The underlying fact is undeniable: all kinds of interest rates—for mortgages, corporate bonds, government bonds, customer loans, money-market paper—have risen since the end of 1955 by at least one-half percentage point (and if compared with the average of 1955 by close to a full percentage point). It does not follow, however, that the scarcity of funds is due to an arbitrary restriction of the credit supply by the monetary authorities. It may very well be nothing but the reflection of a shortage of the resources capable of producing the capital goods desired in the deficit fields of investment mentioned above, that is, in residential building and in the construction work planned by the federal, state, and municipal governments.

Clearly the present credit policy's critics in the Democratic and liberal camps, who plead for more lenient credit conditions, comparable to those in 1954 if not 1951, are assuming that the total of resources available is indeed ample enough to increase investment in the deficit areas to the desired level, without either reducing other investment activities or running into an inflation. Academic economists, on the other hand, apparently take the opposite stand; as so frequently happens, their contentious discussion conceals a unanimity in essentials. Advocates of capital rationing, like Professor Sumner Slichter of Harvard, obviously

assume that the total pie is not large enough—that more funds can be channeled to the inadequately provided investors only by rationing the more fortunate ones (*New York Times*, December 30, 1956). And the Keynesians, unjustly regarded as uncompromising adherents of an easy-money policy, also talk about incipient inflation. Their spokesman, Professor Seymour Harris, stated recently: "There is some justification for a mildly restrictive policy in 1955-1956 . . . The reason for a cautious dear money policy was over-full employment with increased bottlenecks evident."¹

I agree with this diagnosis,² although I hasten to add that the evidence is not overwhelmingly strong. That evidence will now be examined. And since acknowledgment of a scarcity of resources eliminates the simple proposals of the politicians for easier credit conditions, it will be necessary to pay attention also to the idea of capital rationing.

I

A rapid increase in indebtedness—consumer credit and mortgage credit for residential building—is not in itself an indication of inflation; in fact, it is usually mentioned in a different context, as creating the fear of an impending downturn regardless of whether the increase in indebtedness is inflationary or not. It is no proof of an already existing inflation because also the investment of the normal, non-inflationary volume of savings must take the form of either equity investment or loan investment: an increase in the latter may reflect a declining share of the former

¹ Seymour Harris, "The Economics of Eisenhower: A Symposium," in *Review of Economics and Statistics* (November 1956) p. 363. Professor Harris' quarrel with Professor Slichter concerns such points as the wisdom and effects of the monetary policy in 1953 and the comparative achievements in the economic field of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations.

² In his Economic Report of 1957, published after this note was completed, President Eisenhower remarks (p. v): "Financial markets and prices were under continuous pressure . . . High costs of raw materials and wage increases that tended to outrun the year's small gain in productivity were pervasive factors in making for higher prices."

in the total investment, or simply a continuous secular increase in that total, and thus it does not necessarily indicate an increase in the *total* volume beyond the optimum level into the inflationary range.

Of greater weight is the price development. Since 1954 prices outside the agricultural sector have been rising steadily, the increase in 1956 being particularly pronounced.³ Price increases can occur in an economy that does not use in full its resources of capital and labor; they will then be associated with wage increases (which are by no means impossible in the presence of widespread unemployment, as witness the wage rise in the later 1930s). In the last few years, on the other hand, the price increase has exceeded the increase in labor costs per unit of output in manufacturing industries, as indicated by the ratio of hourly wage changes to changes in output per manhour.⁴ The excess, however, is not very great, and the ensuing increase in gross profit must have been partly absorbed by the costs of an increasing amount of invested capital. It would be desirable to have the inflation thesis confirmed from a study of an inventory of physical resources, employed or not employed—a subject which the individual economist is unable to investigate with sufficient accuracy, and which he has not been informed about by public or private agencies possessing an adequate research staff. Some observations may be mentioned, however, which tend to confirm the thesis of incipient inflation.

More liberal credit, a net increase in the current flow of investible funds into the deficit field, would have both a primary and a secondary effect on the demand for goods and services. The primary effect, equal to the increase in investment itself, is rep-

³ During 1952-56, wholesale prices of all commodities exclusive of farm products and processed food were as follows: 1952, 113.2; 1953, 114.0; 1954, 114.5; 1955, 117.0; 1956, 122.2; December 1956, 124.6. In this period the prices of finished goods exclusive of food showed a rise of about 9 to 10 percent, of which more than half occurred in the last year.

⁴ During 1952-56, output per manhour rose by 16 percent and hourly wage rates by 18.6 percent, while wholesale prices of manufactured goods increased by almost 8 percent.

resented by the additional demand for materials, manpower, equipment, to do the construction job in question. The secondary effect is the additional demand for consumer goods materializing when the newly employed spend their wages and the employers their profit.

As a result of the so-called "automatic stabilizers" in the American economy, the secondary effect on demand is not much greater than the primary one. It consists of a small additional demand for food and a somewhat larger additional demand for textiles, but most of the additional spending would be directed to consumer durables and entertainment. Obviously the price inflation from these sources is small. The additional demand for food and textiles can be satisfied to a considerable extent from the accumulated stock (or from what would be currently accumulated in the absence of the new demand). The textile industries themselves are not fully utilized in either equipment or manpower, and the entertainment industries can easily accommodate a few percent more customers. It is only in the field of consumer durables that the additional demand will exercise some pressure on prices, by entailing increased demand for steel and other materials.

But the price outlook for the primary effects of increased investment is less reassuring; here a scarcity of resources is more likely to make itself felt. It is a scarcely disputed fact that the unemployed surplus of manpower in the United States is quite unevenly distributed; labor moves slowly between regions, and hardly ever between trades. To produce more cars or more textiles, manpower would be available. On the other hand, there are regions and trades where it is still scarce. The particular importance of the last point will be seen if it is remembered that though residential building declined in the second half of 1956 below the corresponding level of 1955 (by about 10 percent), total construction activity was maintained rather well: the available skilled labor was transferred from one type of construction to another. The scarcity of this particular resource would render difficult

the desired expansion in the deficit fields, even if all other resources were available.

A similar bottleneck seems to exist in regard to materials. One may argue that the continuous backlog of steel orders is irrelevant in this context, since in most of the deficit fields steel is not required for investment. But a shortage of construction materials has been characteristic during the whole postwar period, as is clearly visible in their above-average price rise, even if 1929 is used as year of comparison; the decline in lumber prices since the fall of 1955 has by no means corrected this imbalance in full.

The preceding remarks may appear paradoxical, for they suggest that low interest rates cause price inflation, even though unit cost is less when rates are low than when they are high. But it may be pointed out that, except for residential building and other investments of long lifetimes, interest plays only a minor role in the cost items: certainly the rise in the price of manufactured goods cannot be ascribed to the rising interest rates. And even in the investments of long lifetimes, the increase in material prices and wages ensuing from an inflationary increase in the credit volume would exercise a much more powerful effect on the price of the product than would, in the absence of this inflation, an increase in interest rates alone.

If these observations are accepted as confirming the thesis of incipient inflation, then an increase in investment in the deficit fields should indeed be encouraged only if investment in the well provided other fields can be reduced, as the advocates of capital rationing propose. Business construction, in particular, would have to be curtailed, and possibly also investment in industrial equipment. The theoretically available alternative, restriction of the demand for consumer durables, has not been discussed recently—presumably because the resources freed by such a restriction could not be made available for expanding activity in the deficit fields.

The practicability of capital rationing in a free enterprise system of the American kind must be doubted. Attempts to use

"moral suasion" on commercial investment banks have never been very successful; and in any case, most of the industrial investment is financed by the retained profits of the investing firms themselves. A somewhat greater success might be obtained by drastically curtailing the granting of certificates for accelerated amortization, which have certainly been a powerful stimulus to industrial investment. But even assuming that ways could be found for curtailing large-scale business investment, are we sure that this curtailment would be desirable? Let us consider the various deficit fields.

The proposal to channel funds away from large-scale business to small-scale business is based on ideas concerning the "morally best" or "most stable" social structure, ideas that are as hard to prove as to refute. The same thing may be said of the suggestion to increase residential building to the level of 1955 or even higher—in financial terms, to freeze credit conditions at the level prevailing in 1955; the current rate of building is certainly still sufficient to provide the net increase in families with houses or apartments, and the number of families forced to double up, because of the scarcity of dwelling space, has been greatly reduced by the intensive building activity in the last ten years. As for road construction, it could scarcely be maintained that at the present rate of construction the roads would be physically unable to carry the existing car fleet, although the drivers' comfort may leave something to be desired. Undoubtedly the strongest case can be made for an increase in school building, though even here one would wish to be informed in detail about the difference between the current rate of construction and the rate to be realized by capital rationing of business construction.

In any case, the disadvantages of the rationing schemes should not be overlooked. It may be taken for granted that no reduction of investment in industrial equipment or public utilities is advocated, except in so far as it would be made up by increasing the share of small business (although a reduction of industrial plant certainly implies a reduced instalment of industrial equip-

ment). This point must be stressed because a million dollars (of constant purchasing power) invested in equipment would employ a considerably greater number of workers than would a million dollars invested in residential building or roads (we speak here of the period when these investments are being used, not of the period in which they are being produced). And certainly a reduction in the average employing power of the additional capital stock arising from investment is a serious matter, especially at a time when production is becoming increasingly automatic: the creation of new factories and thus of new jobs for the technologically unemployed is surely of higher social significance than greater comfort for the motorist.

Even more important is the fact that business investment can, on the whole, be much less easily manipulated than residential building and public investment. The uniformly high rate of business investment in durable equipment since 1947 (22 to 24 billion dollars a year, in constant prices) has not allayed the fears of a setback; and the uniform rise since 1947 in non-residential private construction (industrial, commercial, public-utility construction) has increased those fears. The instability in business investment has created in economic literature the idea of "anti-cyclic" or "compensatory" public-investment policy, whereby public investment would be restricted in times of expanding private investment, and increased in times of decline in private investment; the latter measure is still advocated, but the former seems to be forgotten. It must be conceded that a timely expansion of public investment is not easily achieved under the present legislative and administrative process, but the capital market itself could serve as indicator and as an almost automatic precipitating agent: legislative approval of the desired public investment could be given with the proviso that the bonds to be issued would not require interest beyond a certain level (say $3\frac{1}{2}$ percent).

The regularization of investment in residential building is simpler. The down payment required by the FHA and the VA has proved a powerful tool for stimulating or discouraging the

demand for mortgages; and it should not be difficult to extend this control mechanism to the remaining 25 percent of the mortgage total (the "conventional" mortgages), since the mortgage lending of commercial banks and mutual savings banks is subject anyway to state or federal regulations.

The larger the unsatisfied fringe of borrowers in the deficit fields of investment built up during times of scarce money, the better the chances that we shall succeed in times of declining industrial investment in compensating the effect of that decline on national income. To this end, we have efficient policy measures to expand public investment and investment in residential building. But measures of equal efficiency are not at our disposal for expanding the current rate of industrial investment itself.

II

These reflections will rightly be considered a defense of the so-called "scarce money" policy, that is, of a policy that roughly limits the increase in the money flow (whether from bank-credit expansion or from dishoarding) to the increase in the wage bill; discontinuing the price pegging of government bonds several years ago was only one step in such a program.

But it is not my aim to defend an increase in interest rates in all sectors of the capital market. Let us consider the various categories: the interest rate on first mortgages on residential buildings (more than a third of total net investment); the rates for industrial debentures, customer loans by banks, government bonds; and the short-term rates in the open money market. Common to all categories is the increase in income which a rise in interest rates brings about for the creditor. The total increase is not large (amounting to well under 1 percent of national income per year), for the higher rates apply only to new contracts and the large stock of existing long-term loans pays only the old rates. Nevertheless the increase may be considered undesirable from the point of view of the community's economic welfare,

especially since both observation and theory indicate that an increase in interest rates within the practical range does not increase the current rate of saving.

In the mortgage field the rise of rates from $4\frac{1}{2}$ to 5 percent (except for veterans' mortgages) was in my opinion not inevitable, certainly not for the mortgages insured by the FHA, and probably not for conventional mortgages. A requirement of higher down payments would have effectively restricted the demand for mortgages at an unchanged interest rate, and the differential between the mortgage rate and the yield of bonds (which also had risen) would still have been large enough to keep the commercial banks in the mortgage business. If it is objected that such a policy would unduly favor the "haves" over the "have-nots," it should be remembered that in our times the consumer tends to obligate himself excessively to instalment-debt payments for a long period; a mortgage of 85 percent of a somewhat inflated property value, instead of merely 75 percent, plus an interest rate higher by one-half percentage point on the increased mortgage (plus possibly increased amortization payments) may very well be the straw that breaks the camel's back.

Unfortunately no similarly effective techniques exist for avoiding higher interest rates in the other fields mentioned. Here the shift in income arising from the increase in rates was inevitable. But it can be said that industry and commerce, in contrast to the consumer, are not likely in general to overburden themselves with interest payments; and the government should be able to take care of increased interest charges, to the extent to which they arise from new loans or conversions, from the increase in tax revenue caused by a steadily rising national income.

There is another misunderstanding to which these reflections are exposed: they may seem to imply that a substantial downturn of business is extremely unlikely. In actual fact, what I have described is only possible compensating mechanisms, as they exist in two important fields of investment: those in one of these fields, public investment, are not so perfect as they could be, and of none

of them can it be certain that they will be set into motion in time. Moreover, prosperity is threatened not only by a possible relapse in business investment, where indeed there is some reason to assume that an exhaustion of investment opportunities will materialize only slowly (because of the creation of new opportunities by automation). If at the same time the saturation point is reached in consumer durables, the compensating mechanisms I have discussed might not be adequate. And any substantial decline in per capita income would weaken the force of one of these mechanisms, since the demand for residential building depends not only on credit conditions but also on the current and expected income per capita.

At present, however, the outlook for a continued high demand for consumer durables is certainly more favorable than it was three years ago. These last remarks are merely intended to emphasize that my aim here is not to predict the course of income and employment in the coming years, but to argue that, in the light of available information, criticism of the present state of scarce money is not warranted.

THE SPIRIT OF CHINESE CULTURE

BY CH'U CHAI

MODERN science gives us the freedom to study the specific, but it deprives us of the ability to see life in its entirety. Human life is not compartmentalized. In dividing it into units we miss much that is significant. In Chinese culture we can discern a unity of spirit to which we find no parallel in Western culture. Chinese art, literature, philosophy, and religion are not confined each to its own circle of ideas, but are closely associated with one another. This is the fundamental spirit of Chinese culture, which may be looked at from two points of view: that of cosmic conception and that of attitude toward life. In the former the spirit of Chinese culture is manifested as a continuous whole, like a chain of natural sequences. In the latter the spirit of Chinese culture is manifested in the union of the individual with the whole.

I

Let us first take a brief glance at the salient characteristics of the Chinese cosmic conception. Philosophical thinking is no exception to the general rule that the distinctive characteristics of any domain of thought are determined by its first assumptions. The Chinese cosmic conception is based on the assumption that all that happens in the universe, natural and human, is a continuous whole, like a chain of natural sequences. This is illustrated in the *Yi Ching*, or the *Book of Changes*: "Following the existence of heaven and earth, there is the existence of all things. Following the existence of all things, there is the distinction of sex. Following the distinction of sex, there is the relation between husband and wife. Following the relation between husband and wife, there is the relation between the sovereign and the minister. Following the relation between the sovereign and the

minister, there is the distinction of superiority and inferiority. Following the distinction of superiority and inferiority, there are the arrangements of propriety and righteousness" (Orderly Sequence of Hexagrams, Sect. II).¹ This basic assumption, which conceives of the universe as a continuous whole, leads inevitably to the following characteristics of the Chinese cosmic conception.

First, the universe is regarded as a current, or "the great void": all in the universe is but a transitional process, with no fixed substance for its substratum. The universe is thus supposed to have no reality of its own, outside and independent of its phenomena. In Chinese writings the universe is often identified with the Yi (Change)—thus emphasizing that all things in the universe are ever in a process of change—or with the Tao (the Way, by which all things come to be). To quote again from the *Book of Changes*: "In the Yi there is the Grand Terminus, which generates the Primeval Pair. The Primeval Pair produce the Four Forms, from which are derived the Eight Trigrams. The Eight Trigrams determine the good and the evil, and from this determination is produced the great achievement" (The Great Appendix, Sect. I, Chapter 11). "In the Yi there is no thought, no action. It is in itself still and calm; but, when acted on, it penetrates forthwith to all phenomena and events in the universe. If it were not the great mystery, how could it be found doing this?" (*ibid.*, Chapter 10).

In the works of Lao Tzu we read: "From the Tao there comes One; from One comes Two; from Two comes Three; from Three

¹ Though the commentaries on the *Book of Changes* were written after the time of Confucius, the text itself existed before his time. From this text, originally a book of divination, evolved the later Chinese philosophy. The system of the book has as its basis the eight trigrams (symbols composed of three lines each), which were supposed to be the symbolic representation of the eight worldly natural objects or phenomena. Then each of the eight trigrams was combined with all the others, resulting in sixty-four hexagrams (symbols composed of six lines). Each hexagram was supposed to be the symbolic representation of one or more phenomena of the universe, either human or natural. All the hexagrams put together were supposed to represent symbolically all that had happened in the universe, from heaven and earth to the complexity of human affairs. The book is indeed a remarkable treatise in the history of philosophy.

come all things" (Chapter 42, Sect. 93). And: "There is something evolved from chaos, which existed before the creation of heaven and earth. It is inaudible and invisible; it remains eternal and immutable; it pervades and never ceases. It may be conceived as the Mother of heaven and earth. I do not know its name, and call it Tao. Arbitrarily, I may say that it is great; great means outgoing; outgoing, far-reaching; far-reaching, reversion" (Chapter 25, Sects. 54-55).²

These passages make two points clear, which need be only briefly mentioned. First, in the universe there is a cosmic force that is the source of life. The cosmic force is the Yi (Change) or the Tao (the Way), which generates "One," or the Grand Terminus; and "One," or the Grand Terminus, produces in turn the "Yin" (the passive element, the "matter") and the "Yang" (the active element, the "form")—a kind of dualism, as designated by "Two," or the Primeval Pair. Through the interaction of the Yin and the Yang springs life, as designated by "Three," or the Four Forms, out of which arise all things. And second, the Yi or the Tao is life, spontaneity, evolution, or a transitional process. The comment on the third line of the eleventh hexagram states "There is no level place without a bank, and no departure without a return." This statement is regarded as the invariable law of nature, according to which all things undergo change. This is the Yi or the Tao of the transformation of all things.

This conception of the universe as a transitional process originates in the fundamental spirit of Chinese culture—that is, the whole is not to be severed into units. From the standpoints of

² Lao Tzu, the Old Master, was the earliest prominent Taoist philosopher. He lived in the sixth century B.C., and was contemporary with, but older than, Confucius. Not only did he found the Taoist school of thought, but subsequently he became the supreme god of the Taoist religion. In both capacities Lao Tzu and his teachings have taken a firm hold on the Chinese mind. He was traditionally regarded as author of the first philosophical work in Chinese history, *Tao Te Ching*, or the Book of Tao and Te, though modern scholarship has launched a vigorous argument against the traditional view. "Te" means power or virtue, both in the moral and the non-moral senses; the Te of a thing is what it naturally is. Just as Tao is that by which all things come to be, so Te is that by which all things are what they are.

the Yi or the Tao, there is no separation of things; there are only phases of the same thing, such as the distinction between positive and negative, between subjective and objective. Thus in this state of experience there is nothing but the One, by which all things come to be. Apropos of this, Chuang Tzu said:³ "When there is life, there is death, and when there is death, there is life. When there is possibility, there is impossibility, and when there is impossibility, there is possibility. Because there is right, there is wrong. Because there is wrong, there is right" (the *Chuang-tzu*, Chapter 2).

Things are ever subject to change and have many aspects, for "all these by means of the Tao are united and become One." By ignoring the distinction of contraries, such as life and death, possibility and impossibility, right and wrong, "we all are embraced in the unity of the One," by which all things come into being naturally and spontaneously. The Yi or the Tao is the totality of the spontaneity of all things in the universe. Hence when we say that the Yi or the Tao produces all things we mean nothing more than the plain fact that all things produce themselves, naturally and spontaneously. Thus Confucius, looking at a running stream, exclaimed "Alas! That which is passing is just like this, never ceasing day and night" (*Analects*, IX-16).

The second basic characteristic of the Chinese cosmic conception is the principle that the universe does not proceed onward, but revolves, without beginning, without end. All phenomena in the universe move not toward a bourn whence nothing returns, but in a circular process. The entire universe is one continuous chain in which nothing is absolutely completed or finished. This may be illustrated by quoting a passage from the *Book of Changes*: "One who surpasses others is sure to remedy [evils that exist],

³ Chuang Tzu, also known as Chuang Chou, lived in the fourth century B.C., and was perhaps the greatest of the early Taoists. We know little of his life, save that he was famous for his ideas and writings. The book entitled the *Chuang-tzu* was compiled by Kuo Hsiang, Chuang Tzu's great commentator, who lived in the third century A.D. We are not sure which of the chapters of the *Chuang-tzu* were really written by Chuang Tzu himself, but a large portion of the book represents his philosophy even though it may not all have been written by him.

and therefore the hexagram Hsiao Kwo [a little better] is followed by the hexagram Chi-chi [something accomplished]. But the succession of things can never come to an end, and therefore the hexagram Chi-chi is followed by the hexagram Wei-chi [something not yet accomplished]. With this hexagram [the Yi] comes to a close" (Orderly Sequence of Hexagrams, Sect. II).

Thus one hexagram is usually followed by another that is opposite in character—a view that is prominent in the writings of many of the ancient philosophers. Here is a statement from the works of Lao Tzu which shows the evolution of the universe: "The way of heaven is like stretching a bow. When the upper part is leveled, the lower part is raised up. When the excess is diminished, the deficiency is replenished" (Chapter 77, Sect. 170). This is the normal rhythm of nature. Were the universe to reverse the normal rhythm, it would cease to function. In the *Book of Changes* it is said: "When the sun goes, the moon comes; when the moon goes, the sun comes—the sun and the moon thus take the place each of the other, and their shining is the result. When the cold goes, the warmth comes; when the warmth goes, the cold comes—it is by this mutual succession of the cold and the warmth that the year is completed" (The Great Appendix, Sect. II, Chapter 5). This is the invariable law of nature, that anything develops to its extreme, invariably reverts to its opposite; that is, to borrow an expression from Hegel, everything involves its own negation—though according to Hegel, when a thing is negated a new thing commences on a higher level, whereas according to Chinese philosophers, when a thing is negated the new thing simply repeats the old.

The earliest of the Neo-Confucianists of the Sung dynasty (960–1279) were chiefly interested in cosmology.⁴ They were indeed authorities on natural phenomena that presented examples of the circular process in the succession of day and night, the periodic ebb and flow of the tide, the disappearance and return

⁴ See Ch'u Chai, "Neo-Confucianism of the Sung-Ming Periods," in *Social Research*, vol. 18, no. 3 (September 1951).

of planets, and the other sequential phenomena, deducing the explanation of natural phenomena from principles found in the *Book of Changes*.

Chou Tung-yi (1017-73), for instance, known as the great cosmological philosopher, studied and developed the ideas found in the *Book of Changes* and used diagrams to illustrate the process of cosmic evolution. In his famous *Diagram of the Grand Terminus* he begins with a ring or circle of uniform whiteness, representing the Tai Chi, or the Grand Terminus. Then follows a circle partly dark, which shows the primordial essence, differentiated into static and dynamic forces, called the Yin (the passive element) and the Yang (the active element). In his explanation of the diagram he said: "The Grand Terminus through Movement produces the Yang. This movement, having reached its limit, is followed by Quiescence, and by this Quiescence it produces the Yin. When Quiescence has reached its limit, there is a return to Movement. Thus Movement and Quiescence, in alternation, become each the source of the other. The distinction between the Yin and the Yang is determined. . . . By their interaction [they] operate to produce all things, and these in their turn produce and reproduce, so that transformation and change continue without end" (Collected Works of Chou Tung-yi, Book I). This passage presents at least two ideas: that in the process of evolution everything involves its own negation; and that in the process of evolution "transformation and change continue without end."

Another cosmological philosopher was Shao Yung (1011-77), who also deduced his system from the ideas found in the *Book of Changes*, and, like Chou Tung-yi, made use of diagrams to illustrate his cosmological theory. According to Shao Yung, the Yin can be interpreted as merely negation of the Yang. Hence if the Yang is the constructive force of the universe, the Yin is its destructive force. On the basis of the interaction of the Yin and the Yang, he illustrated the universal law that everything involves its own negation, a principle that was stressed in the

Book of Changes, as well as in the works of Lao Tzu. This law applies not only to the alternation of seasons throughout the year, but also to the alternation of day and night every twenty-four hours.

The third cosmological philosopher was Chang Tsai (1020-77) who, like his predecessors, based his cosmological theory on the *Book of Changes*. His theory especially emphasized the idea of Ch'i (Matter), a concept that became more and more important in the cosmological and metaphysical theories of the later Neo-Confucianists.⁵ In his *Correct Discipline for Beginners*, Chang Tsai said: "The Great Harmony is known as the Tao. Because in it there are interacting qualities of floating and sinking, rising and falling, movement and quiescence, there appear in it the beginning of the emanating forces which agitate one another, overcome one another, and contract or expand, one with regard to the other" (Collected Works, Book 2). The Great Harmony is a name for the Ch'i, or Matter in its entirety, which Chang Tsai described as "wandering air." The qualities of floating, rising, and movement are those of the Yang, while those of sinking, falling, and quiescence are those of the Yin. Thus the Ch'i, influenced by the Yang qualities, floats and rises, while, influenced by the Yin qualities, it sinks and falls. Hence the Ch'i is constantly either condensing or dispersing. Its condensation results in the creation of things; its dispersal results in the dissolution of these things.

This conception of the universe as a circular process, like the conception of the universe as a transitional process, originates in the fundamental Chinese conception that the whole is not to be severed into units. The universe is composed of pairs of opposites, such as good and evil, right and wrong, subjective

⁵ "In the universe," says Chu Hsi, "there are Li and Ch'i. The Li is the Tao that pertains to 'what is above shapes,' and is the source from which all things are produced. The Ch'i is the material that pertains to 'what is within shapes,' and is the means whereby things are produced. Hence men or things, at the moment of their production, must receive this Li in order to have a nature of their own. They must receive this Ch'i in order to have their bodily form" ("Reply to Huang Tao-fu," Collected Works, Book 58).

and objective, positive and negative. In the process of evolution every phenomenon involves its own negation. One and its negation are necessary parts making up the whole. We cannot have, for instance, a positive without a negative, or vice versa. They are correlatives which involve each other. Thus the universe proceeds in cyclic recurrence, without beginning, without end.

And finally, the third basic characteristic of the Chinese cosmic conception is that it envisages no divine power that controls the motion of the universe. Lao Tzu (in his *Works*, Chapter 25, Sect. 56) said that within the universe there are four great ones—Tao, heaven, earth, and king—but God is not one of them. Confucius considered man to be the center of heaven and earth, and spoke of heaven as being on the side of righteousness. Mencius, who lived in the fourth century B.C. and represented the idealistic wing of Confucianism, identified human nature with heaven (in Chinese, Tien, which is sometimes translated as heaven, or divinity, and sometimes as nature). Hsun Tzu, who lived in the third century B.C. and represented the realistic wing of Confucianism, even ventured to argue that heaven could be controlled for human purposes.

An exception was Mo Tzu (who lived in the fifth century B.C. and founded the Mohist school, opposing both the traditional institutions and practices and the theories of Confucius and the Confucianists), for he preached the principle of all-embracing love and embodied the principle in a personalized God: "Those who desire wealth and honor must obey the will of God," but also "I do what God wills, while God endows me with what I deserve" (*Works*, Chapter 26). Thus the relationship between God and man is one of reciprocity, and indeed, God helps only those who help themselves. Moreover, Mo Tzu had only an inconclusive argument to prove the existence of God and His power: "All people are the subjects of God. Why does He not love them? Besides, I said that one who kills the innocent must have bad fortune. Who kills the innocent? Man. Who imposes the bad fortune? God" (*Works*, Chapter 26). This inconclusive

argument was refuted by later philosophers. But Mo Tzu, like most practical philosophers, had no interest in pure metaphysical truth. His doctrine of the will of God was intended only to induce people to believe that they will be rewarded if they practice all-embracing love, and punished if they do not.

Then, in the Han school of thought, which aimed to make Confucianism the orthodox belief of the Han dynasty, we are told that heaven punishes the unjust with bad fortune and rewards the just with good fortune. But the concept "heaven" as conceived here is not personalized; thus it is no longer the center of power, but is simply a way in which the good or the evil of man is given reward or punishment. It is so because of the design of man, not the will of heaven. Consequently, reward and punishment by heaven are the results of man's own efforts. During the Sung-Ming periods Neo-Confucianism identified Tien Li, or divine righteousness, with the conscience of man. There can be little doubt that this philosophy of identifying divine righteousness with the conscience of man must have helped to confirm and perpetuate the fusion and intermixture of the authority of God with the power of man, and the decree of heaven with the laws of government.

The absence of a conception of a controlling divine power may be illustrated by reference to Chinese mythical legends and fables. In the mythical and legendary period of Chinese history we encounter the figure of Queen Nu Kua, who repaired heaven with colored stones, that of King Hou Yi, who shot at the sun with an arrow, and that of K'ua Fu, who chased after the sun, but we never find any legendary figure who created heaven and earth. The Chinese lack a poetic mythology to advance a practical conception of the creation of the universe. Even P'an Ku, the "Chaos Man," who seems to have come into being endowed with perfect knowledge, had the function of setting the economy of the universe in order, not of creating it. He is often depicted as wielding a huge adz and engaged in constructing the world. With his death, the details of creation began. His tears became rivers and seas;

his breath, wind; his voice, thunder; his pupils, lightning; while parasites infesting his body were progenitors of the human race. Thus P'an Ku did not create the universe; the universe came into existence after his death.

Here again, in the lack of a conception of divine supremacy in the universe, we find a reflection of the fundamental spirit of Chinese culture, that the whole is not to be severed into units. Divine power or a Creator owes its existence to a unit that is subtracted from the whole. But the Chinese cosmos is a united whole, undivided and indivisible. Anything divisible must be divided by something other than itself. Since there is nothing other than the whole, there cannot be units apart from the whole. Consequently the idea of supreme power or a Creator cannot be conceived.

We see, then, that the character of the Chinese cosmic conception is fixed by the basic assumption that the universe is a continuous whole. There is a spirit of general elevation and enlightenment in which all alike communicate and to which Chinese culture owes much of its dignity and influence. This is so because all things are relative and in a state of flux: there is no absolute difference, no absolute separation; everything is constantly changing into something else, and therefore all things are one. The Chinese cosmic conception rests on the fundamental idea that all that happens in the universe, natural and human alike, forms a continuous chain of natural sequences.

II

Now let us turn to a consideration of the characteristics of the Chinese attitude toward life, where we shall see that the fundamental spirit of Chinese culture is manifested in the merging of the unit in the whole. Chinese philosophy of life posits not antagonism but continuity in the world, as is illustrated by the following characteristics.

First, the Chinese see life as good. Buddha said that life itself is the root and fountainhead of its misery. To the Hindus the

present world is "a sea of bitterness," and life is like a dream. And according to Christianity, endless evils emerged from life after the fall of man. But the Chinese, so far as their literature is concerned, are not pessimistic in their outlook on life. In Chinese philosophy the expression of a distinctively pessimistic type of thought is wanting.

Even Yang Chu, who probably lived between the times of Mo Tzu and Mencius (a chapter representing his philosophy is contained in the *Lieh Tzu*, a Taoist work of the third century A.D.), held a view of life only slightly tinged with pessimism. According to his view, life is short, and a great part of it, strictly speaking, is not life. Therefore "We ought to hasten to enjoy life and pay no attention to death." In his basic outlook Yang Chu was a hedonist rather than a pessimist, "despising things and valuing life." His hedonist ideas are reflected in the ancient classics: "There is a man whose policy is not to enter a city which is in danger, not to remain in the army. Even for the great profit of the whole world, he would not exchange one hair of his shank. . . . He is one who despises things and values life" (the *Han-fei-tzu*, Chapter 50); "Preserving life and maintaining what is genuine in it, not allowing things to entangle one's person: this is what Yang Chu established" (the *Huai-nan-tzu*, Chapter 13).

Reflection of this hedonist idea can also be found in the works of the great Taoist philosophers. In the writings of Lao Tzu we read: "Therefore, if a man esteems the world as much as he esteems himself, he will find safety therein. If a man loves the world as much as he loves himself, he will find security therein" (Chapter 13, Sect. 25); and "Fame or life—which is more precious? Life or property—which is worth more?" (Chapter 44, Sect. 97). Again, the idea of despising things and valuing life. And Chuang Tzu said: "When you do something good, beware of reputation; when you do something evil, beware of punishment. Follow the middle way and take this to be your constant principle. Then you can guard your person, nourish your parents, and complete your natural term of years" (Chapter 3). According to the early

Taoists this is the best way to preserve life against the harms that come from the human world.

Nearly all the philosophers of the Confucian school appreciated the good of life. Thus we read in the *Book of Changes*: "For the universe, the most essential is life. For the sage, the most precious is the state. That which maintains the state is man. That which maintains the people is wealth. The administration of wealth, the education of the people, and the prohibition of wrongdoing are his righteousness" (The Great Appendix, Sect. II, Chapter 1). Nature is life; state, wealth, education, prohibition, are all to make life better. Confucius' own life is certainly a good example of this aspect of his teaching. Disapproving of the degeneracy of his own times he turned at an early age to the vocation of reformer. He traveled everywhere and talked with everybody. Although his efforts were in vain, he was not disappointed.

Among the Chinese, every man, rich or poor, educated or uneducated, has a passionate love of life. All are imbued with this one great ideal, which touches their common existence in every direction and furnishes an important and steady influence on the nation. The Chinese may lament over their human ills, but they never curse life as such. Whatever may be their innermost thoughts, they bear their crushing burdens and desperate privations with extraordinary fortitude and little complaint. What they insist on is simply the idea that in order to live well, one must live, but in order to live, one must try to get the best out of life and enjoy what one has. Feeling the continuity of the whole and the unit, the Chinese do not seek for the "happy land" outside this world, because one cannot be totally excluded from this world.

The second characteristic of the Chinese attitude toward life is that it cherishes "benevolent" love. Love is an emotion common to mankind, but "benevolent" love is peculiar to the Chinese. If I were asked for a definition of benevolent love, I would confess that I could not give any precise answer. Perhaps the same purpose will be served if I present some of the leading traits that

distinguish it from Buddhist love, Christian love, and Platonic love.

Buddhist love is charitable, motivated by charity, as exemplified in the life of Buddha. Usually it takes the form of compassion. Is it not charity to men that the abbot expressed when he said "My desire is to pluck every creature that is endowed with feeling out of this sea of bitterness"? Thus the lover and the loved live in two different spheres of existence. Christian love, on the other hand, is cosmopolitan. Jesus Christ offered a faultless example of a life dominated by love. "For God so loved the world that He gave His only begotten son," that "the world through Him might be saved." It is the will of God that man should love his neighbor as himself. Platonic love, finally, is abstract. The phrase "Platonic love" is on the lips of many, but usually with a meaning quite different from Plato's own conception of love. According to Plato, love is always concerned with beauty. Having learned to love one beautiful object, the soul passes on to love other beautiful objects. Platonic love lays stress on the idea of beauty.

According to the Chinese benevolent love, the lover and the loved live in the same world, for each other and with each other. Benevolence is fundamental in Chinese love, just as compassion is dominant in Buddhist love. Confucius said that "benevolence consists in loving others" (*Analects*, XII-22), and he held that human relations should be based on the moral sentiment of benevolence leading to positive efforts for the good of others. "Benevolence," said Mencius, "is the love due to man . . . One who loves men will certainly be loved by men." This is the first point. The second point is that Chinese benevolent love is based on fairness. It is not equal and universal love. It manifests itself in different degrees of intensity, consistent with the exercise in due degree of relative affections, such as filial piety, fraternal feelings, conjugal love. Hence Chinese benevolent love plays its part in the relations between different kinds of people; its exaggeration or total absence would upset the social order. This fact serves to

distinguish it from Christian love. The third point is that Platonic love is too subtle an idea for popular comprehension. Ancient Chinese thinkers considered beauty one of the virtues, and virtues are cultivated by man. Hence Chinese benevolent love is based not on the idea of beauty but on humanity.

We may conclude that Chinese benevolent love is love of mankind. Chinese do not follow God or Buddha in loving others; nor do they conform to any abstract ideal of loving others. Their love is mainly humanistic, and has been displayed in Chinese cultural achievements for thousands of years. The Chinese do not divide the universe into two different spheres of existence; they live all in the same world, occupy themselves with human relations, and pass on to the love of others—again a merging of the unit in the whole.

The third characteristic of the Chinese attitude toward life is its rational approach to happiness. The Chinese are well known as a cheerful and easily contented people; they have always been jealous of their right to happiness, which no poverty or disgrace can take away from them. In the *Analects* we read: "The master said: 'The wise are free from doubts; the virtuous, from concerns; the courageous, from fear'" (IX-28), and "The master said: 'The superior man is completely at ease; the petty man is always on edge'" (VII-36). Thus Confucius made happiness the chief requisite of the way of the "superior man."

The Chinese have always been interested in the problem of happiness, and their approach to it is very rational or philosophical. A Chinese man depends for his happiness not on external circumstances, but on his own virtue. He wants only what leads to happiness, and at the same time does not insist on having what is beyond his reach. The Chinese have much to offer to counteract our modern ills, particularly by showing the folly of self-seeking and the value of contentment. "One who is contented is always happy" is a saying that contains much of human wisdom. As for himself, Confucius said: "To eat only vegetables and drink only water, with bent arms for pillow, I am still happy in such a

life. But ill-gotten wealth and honors are to me as wandering clouds" (*Analects*, VII-15). This spirit of happiness is found in both the educated and the uneducated classes, for such is the penetration of the Chinese racial tradition.

The Chinese attempt no separation of happiness and virtue. Happiness and virtue are correlatives which are complementary to each other. "One who has not tasted the bitterness of life can never be expected to appreciate the sweetness of life." This maxim has taken so strong a hold on the mind of the Chinese as to have molded their mentality and temperament. The theory of virtue as its own reward is too abstract for the mass of mankind. The great majority of people are so utilitarian that virtue has no charm when it is totally dissociated from happiness. Thus happiness must not be divorced from virtue. The fundamental principle underlying the combination of happiness and virtue is the continuity of the universe: happiness and virtue are simply phases of a continuous whole.

Fourthly, the Chinese favor enjoyment of the present life, and are not much concerned with a life in a world to come. Of the four objects on which Confucius would not speak, "spiritual being" was one. When he was once asked by a disciple about the meaning of death, Confucius replied: "Not yet understanding life, how can you understand death?" (*Analects*, XI-11). This is not to imply that the Chinese deny the existence of a spiritual world; it means that they attach paramount importance to the world of humanity.

Westerners attempt to secure rewards in another world by working and suffering in this world; for instance, the Greek "spiritual world," Plato's "intellectual world," the Christian "City of God," took shape from the hope for a "paradise." Westerners' attitude toward life looks outward upon the external world; they emphasize the expansion of power in space, and strive for a future world in which all that is bad and ugly in the present world will be metamorphosed into the good and beautiful. Thus their life tends to sever the world into units, and to separate man from

heaven. It is this that determines the character of the Greco-Roman-Christian attitude toward life.

The Hindus are impressed by the transitory nature of things, and lament over the endless ills of life. They profess to draw man away from the world and its vanities, in order to reach the freedom and peace of Nirvana, that is, to attain the extinction of consciousness by ascetic exercises. Thus they need not sever the whole into units, for neither exists; nor do they need separate man from heaven, for both have passed beyond the sphere of sensory perception.

But the Chinese, unlike the Hindus, believe that in the present world there is enough good for us to enjoy. The Chinese have no "lost paradise" in the past, and hold to no promise of an after-life. They look inward upon themselves, emphasizing the continuation of life in time and looking for the betterment of life in the present world. Thus a Chinese man, when he dies, is consoled not by the hope of a future life but by an underlying sentiment for the welfare of the coming generation, who will remember him, think of him, love him, to the end of time.

In the Chinese mind the universe is a united whole. For the universe there is no end of evolution; for man there is no end of activity. The union of the universe and man is called "perfection." In the *Chung Yung*, or the *Doctrine of the Mean* (traditionally attributed to K'ung Chi or K'ung Tzu-ssu, the grandson of Confucius), it is said: "Perfection is the beginning and end of things. Without perfection there can be nothing. Therefore the superior man considers the attainment of perfection as the most excellent" (Chapter 25). It is for this reason that the Chinese do not look for another "happy land" on which depends the hope of immortality; nor do they believe in a former state of existence to which the fate of present life is attributable. Their constant endeavor is to maintain the continuity of the present, in which all things are in harmony and in accord: "All things live together without injuring one another; all courses are pursued without collision with one another" (the *Doctrine of the Mean*, Chapter 30).

And lastly, the Chinese are possessed of a sense of moderation. Westerners lay emphasis on the hope of entering the "Kingdom of God," which means the creation of a new world. Hindus place stress on the hope of reaching Nirvana, which means renunciation of the world. Being too extreme, both fail to maintain the balance of the universe. But the Chinese hold the position of the mean. In the *Book of Changes* the sixth line of the first hexagram "Chien" (the symbol of Firmness, representing heaven) is "the dragon in extreme," about which Confucius said: "When things are carried to extreme, there will be occasion for repentance" (The Text, Sect. I, Chapter 1). The *Book of Changes* says: "Therefore the superior man, when resting in safety, does not forget that danger may come; when in a state of security, he does not forget the possibility of ruin; and when all is in a state of order, he does not forget that disorder may come" (The Great Appendix, Sect. II, Chapter 5). This is also the doctrine of Lao Tzu, who said: "Calamity will promote blessing; blessing, too, underlies calamity. Who knows the end of this cycle? How can there be absolute right? The right may turn out to be wrong; the good may turn out to be evil. Man has thus been so long astray" (the *Tao Te Ching*, Chapter 58, Sect. 129).

This passage provides the principal argument for the doctrine of the golden mean, about which the ancient sages and philosophers often talked in their teachings. The doctrine has had a great influence on the Chinese people: they remain cautious even in the time of prosperity, and hopeful even in the time of extreme danger. To attain the mean is not, however, to pursue a middle course; it is to maintain the balance of the universe, a state of harmony and a doctrine of equality. In other words, this is a way of action that avoids going to extremes, a state of mind in which human reasoning and feeling reach perfect harmony. This is why the ancient sages and philosophers taught the Chinese to attempt "never too much"—that is, not to be onesided and extreme, but to attain the mean in order that the balance of the universe may be maintained.

III

From the comprehensive views discussed in connection with the Chinese cosmology and attitude toward life, it is clear that in the mind of the Chinese people the universe is a continuous whole in which all that happens is in harmony and orderliness. In fact, the various forms of intellectual activity that make up the fabric of Chinese culture embrace and rest upon the concept of harmony and orderliness.

Harmony and orderliness, as they appear to the Chinese people, are omnipresent in both natural phenomena and human relations. Nature presents examples of harmony and orderliness in the succession of day and night, the periodical ebb and flow of the tide, the disappearance and return of planets, and other observable sequential phenomena. The principal relations of the individual to the world, copiously illustrated in the Chinese classics, are the "five relations" of sovereign and people, parent and child, husband and wife, brother and brother, friend and friend, which contain the entire structure of the social fabric.

The ancient sages and philosophers instituted rites to maintain orderliness, and music to establish harmony. In the *Li Chi* or the *Book of Rites*, one of the three prominent treatises on the subject of rituals in ancient times, Confucian scholars of the Han dynasty gave interpretations of the ancient rites. And in the *Li Chi* we read: "Music imitates the harmony of the universe; rites imitate the orderliness of the universe. There are heaven above and earth below, and between them are the various things with different ranks and dignity. This gives man the pattern of rites. There is the unceasing stream of evolution, in which all things are in harmony and in accord. This gives man the model of music. In the spring all things burst forth with life; in the summer all things grow. This is benevolence. In the autumn all things mature; in the winter all things rest. This is righteousness. Benevolence is akin to music; righteousness is akin to rites" (Sect. I, Chapter 18). This is the great principle—harmony and orderliness—which underlies the spirit of Chinese culture.

WOODROW WILSON AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS*

BY QUINCY WRIGHT

I AM going to argue that Wilson, as a political scientist and statesman, was a pragmatist. I am aware, of course, that Wilson has the reputation of being dogmatic and inflexible, the opposite of pragmatic; he was undoubtedly a devout Presbyterian. But I do not speak of Wilson's personal, ethical convictions or religion. His political thought, whether expressed abstractly as a professor or practically as President of the United States, was pragmatic.

Pragmatism as I understand it is the application of scientific method to the solution of human problems, especially moral, economic, and political problems. It urges that behavior be governed by principles that have been tested by experience. It differs from dogmatism, which also pays great respect to general principles, in that it insists that principles be continually tested and retested by experience. It does not respect a principle or generalization merely because it is old, beautifully expressed, associated with divine revelation, or found workable under conditions that no longer exist. In insisting that moral and political principles must be related to the conditions in which they are to function, it is progressive and departs from the dogmatist's insistence that such principles are eternal, immutable, and universal even though the world changes. For this reason, as Horace Kallen once observed, pragmatism is not likely to become a popular philosophy. "Men," he said, "have invented philosophy precisely because they find change, chance and process too much for them, and desire infallible security and certainty."¹

* EDITORS' NOTE—This article is based on Dr. Wright's Horace Kallen Lecture, delivered at the General Seminar of the Graduate Faculty of the New School, on December 12, 1956, as part of the New School's celebration of the centenary of Woodrow Wilson's birth.

¹ Horace M. Kallen, "Pragmatism," in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 12 (1934) p. 311.

Pragmatism differs also from opportunism and empiricism, which take little interest in principles and generalizations but regard any action as ethically and politically valid if its immediate results are satisfactory. The pragmatist tests the quality of an act not by its results but by its conformity to a principle that experience has shown is most likely to yield satisfactory results under the conditions and circumstances in which it is applied.

It seems to me that Wilson's statement to his advisers on the ship as he proceeded to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 precisely expresses the pragmatic attitude. The Covenant of the League of Nations, he said, should be "worked out in a general form . . . relying on experience to guide subsequent action." And in regard to the Conference itself he asked the experts to "Tell me what is right and I will fight for it; give me a guaranteed position."² The genuineness of this position of Wilson's will, I think, be disclosed by examining carefully the evolution of his attitude toward the League of Nations.

I

There can be no doubt that Woodrow Wilson, though he himself denied it,³ deserves the title "Founder of the League of Nations," which appeared on the old League of Nations building in Geneva. His successful espousal of the League as a central theme of the peace treaties ending World War I grew out of a profound conviction that such an organization was the indispensable means for securing major American values of peace, democracy, national independence, and the rule of law under twentieth-century conditions of technology and interdependence. These were American values, and their realization for the United States was an American national interest. But he became convinced that in a shrinking and interdependent world they could be secured for the United States only if they were secured for all other nations,

² James T. Shotwell, *At the Paris Peace Conference* (New York 1937) pp. 76-78, also p. 26.

³ See his address in Seattle, September 13, 1919, in Saul K. Padover, ed., *Wilson's Ideals*, American Council on Public Affairs (Washington 1942) p. 104.

great or small.⁴ He was also convinced that the League was indispensable for dealing justly with the immediate problems of the peace—territorial adjustments, reparation and rehabilitation, restoration of trade, development of colonies, and reduction of armaments. He appreciated that the passions of war made it inevitable that injustices would be imposed in the peace treaties, and looked to the League for future amelioration when passions had cooled.⁵

This conviction, however, was not the consequence of his scholarly thinking as a professor of political science, or of his political experience as Governor of New Jersey and President of the United States. It was the consequence of his persistent thought in dealing with the practical problems thrust upon him during World War I. The theoretical and practical knowledge of politics that had been his life study came to his assistance, but he had to adapt it to a type of problem to which he had given little attention.

In reading Wilson's books on political science one is impressed by the absence of attention to foreign affairs. In *Congressional Government*, first published in 1885,⁶ he refers (p. 50) to the "treaty-marring power" of the Senate, which he says developed during the period of international tranquility after the Napoleonic Wars, when the vigor of the Presidential office was reduced

⁴ See the following addresses, in Padover, *op. cit.*: Arlington, Virginia, May 30, 1916 (p. 11); to the Senate, January 22, 1917 (p. 71); to Congress (war message), April 2, 1917 (p. 89); to Congress (Fourteen Points), January 8, 1918 (p. 111); Mount Vernon, July 4, 1918 (p. 96); Boston, February 24, 1919 (p. 112); New York, March 4, 1919 (p. 120). See also August Heckscher, ed., *The Politics of Woodrow Wilson* (New York 1956) pp. 262 ff., 273 ff., 299 ff. Wilson's speeches are also conveniently assembled in J. B. Scott, ed., *Official Statements of War Aims and Peace Proposals, December 1916 to November 1918*, Carnegie Endowment (Washington 1921).

⁵ See his addresses before the Peace Conference, January 25, 1919, and to the Senate, July 10, 1919, in Heckscher, *op. cit.*, pp. 335, 365; also David Hunter Miller, *The Drafting of the Covenant* (New York 1928) vol. 1, pp. 76 ff. In his address to the Senate, January 22, 1917, Wilson said "The peace must be made secure by the organized major force of mankind," but at Mount Vernon, July 4, 1918 (Padover, *op. cit.*, p. 96), he said "What we need is the reign of law, based upon the consent of the governed, and sustained by the organized opinion of mankind." His thought had traveled from "the" peace to peace in general.

⁶ Woodrow Wilson, *Congressional Government, A Study in American Politics*, 15th ed. (Boston 1900).

and the United States became a government by Congressional committees. But his concern with this type of government was due not primarily to its ill effects on the conduct of foreign policy but to its inadequacies in domestic policy. It was not until the 15th edition of this book, published in 1900, that he gave serious attention to foreign affairs. In the preface he then discussed the new role of the United States in the world after the Spanish-American War, the increased importance this would inevitably give to the Presidency, and the probability that the new situation would make his book obsolete.

In his textbook entitled *The State*, published first in 1889, he compares governments from the time of ancient Greece to the present.⁷ "Foreign affairs," however, has only one entry in the index, and this concerns the constitutional distribution of power under the German Imperial Constitution of 1871 (p. 266, par. 427). A reference under "international law" in the index refers to a brief discussion comparing the "naturalism" of Bluntschli with the "positivism" of Bulmerincq. Wilson preferred the latter, and noted the trend toward a world society, manifested by great international congresses and lawmaking treaties. He concluded this discussion in the Austinian tradition: "International law is, therefore, not law at all in the strict sense of that term. It is not, as a whole, the will of any state: there is no authority set above the nations whose command it is" (p. 628, pars. 1216, 1217). It is only what nations ought to observe or what they have generally observed, not what they *must* observe. The index of this large book on the state indicates no other discussion of international relations, and the chapter on the functions of government is concerned with the distinction between "constituent" and "ministrant" functions. The former include, among eight others, the function of "dealing with foreign powers: the preservation of the state from external danger of encroachment, and the advancement of its international interests" (p. 639, par. 1233).

⁷ Woodrow Wilson, *The State, Elements of Historical and Practical Politics* (Boston 1895).

It is indeed remarkable, and is illustrative both of the condition of the country and of Wilson's conception of political science, that in a book of 668 pages fewer than four should allude to international relations. He is concerned with the problem of *laissez faire* versus socialism, in the scope of domestic government, and with the distinction between what is and what ought to be, in the approach to political science. His conclusion on the latter point indicates the realism, not unmingled with idealism, of his approach. "Under no circumstances," he writes, "may we instructively or safely begin with the question of opinion: the answer to the question of fact is the indispensable foundation to all sound reasoning concerning government, which is at all points based upon experience rather than upon theory" (p. 638, par. 1231). The volume ends with the statement: "The rule of governmental action is necessary cooperation; the method of political development is conservative adaptation, shaping old habits into a new one, modifying old means to accomplish new ends" (p. 668, par. 1287).

In his book *Constitutional Government*, presented as lectures at Columbia and published in 1908, he devotes more attention to foreign policy than in the earlier volumes.⁸ He foresees a new Presidential leadership, like that of the first period of American independence, as American involvement in foreign relations becomes greater, which will inevitably occur. There is, in this book, no direct suggestion of a League of Nations, though the points he made in the preface to the 15th edition of *Congressional Government* are amplified. "The President," he writes now (p. 78), "can never again be the mere domestic figure he has been throughout so large a part of our history. The Nation has risen to the first rank in power and resources. The other nations of the world look askance upon her, half in envy, half in fear, and wonder with a deep anxiety what she will do with her vast strength. . . . Our President must always, henceforth, be one of the great

⁸ Woodrow Wilson, *Constitutional Government in the United States* (New York 1917).

powers of the world, whether he act greatly and wisely or not, and the best statesmen we can produce will be needed to fill the office of Secretary of State. We have but begun to see the presidential office in this light; but it is the light which will more and more beat upon it, and more and more determine its character and its effect upon the politics of the nation."

II

After the event, research has disclosed early Wilsonian utterances looking toward the League idea. In 1887 Wilson spoke of "governments joined with governments for the pursuit of common purposes, in honorary equality and honorable subordination."⁹ But in view of the continuous discussion of the idea by writers such as Emeric Crucé, William Penn, the Abbé St. Pierre, Jean Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, and others since the French statesman Sully reported the alleged "grand design" of Henry IV in the early seventeenth century, the surprising thing is that Wilson dealt so little with the subject.

The first positive statement of Wilson looking toward a League of Nations occurred in the autumn of 1914, when according to his brother-in-law Stockton Ackson, Wilson, concerned with the war and its aftermath, suggested that four things would have to be done: "First, that small nations shall have equal rights with great nations; second, that never again must it be permitted for a foot of ground to be obtained by conquest; third, that the manufacture of munitions of war must be by governments and not by private enterprise; and fourth, that all nations must be absorbed into some great association of nations whereby all shall guarantee the integrity of each so that any one nation violating the agreement between all of them shall bring punishment on itself automatically."¹⁰

⁹ See Harley Notter, *Origins of the Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson* (Baltimore 1937) pp. 43, 104 ff., 521; Ruhl J. Bartlett, *The League to Enforce Peace* (Chapel Hill 1944) p. 52.

¹⁰ Notter, *op. cit.*, pp. 328 ff.; Bartlett, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

From this acorn grew Wilson's idea of the League, first publicly expressed in his address to the League to Enforce Peace, in May 1916;¹¹ reaffirmed in his address to the Senate on January 22, 1917, reporting on his mediation efforts; and made a war aim in his war message of April 2, 1917, and his Fourteen Points address to Congress of January 8, 1918. The latter called for "a general association of nations . . . under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike." It is significant that up to this point Wilson preferred the term "association" to "League."¹²

It is to be noted that in these statements Wilson indicated not only the idea of an association of nations but much of the form that was eventually set forth in the Covenant. That form included eight major elements:

1) A permanent organization with headquarters, secretariat, and frequent meetings of representatives of states. This was the essence of all proposals on the subject.

2) An obligation of the members to submit all disputes to a conference or to some form of pacific settlement. This was the central idea of the Bryan conciliation treaties, concluded just before the war. The Taft arbitration treaties, defeated by the Senate, had included the idea, which had been vaguely foreseen in the Hague Convention of 1899 for Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Minister, emphasized this idea, as did the American League to Enforce Peace.

3) A general guarantee of territorial integrity and political independence. This was suggested by the Monroe Doctrine and

¹¹ Bartlett, *op. cit.*, p. 51; League to Enforce Peace, *Enforced Peace*, Proceedings of the First Annual National Assembly, Washington, May 26-27, 1916 (New York 1916) pp. 159 ff.; Heckscher (cited above, note 4) pp. 258 ff.

¹² Bartlett, *op. cit.*, p. 52; Miller (cited above, note 5) vol. 1, pp. 12, 18. The word "League" had been used by the British, and by the American League to Enforce Peace. The French used the word *société*, which appears in the official French text of the Covenant.

by Wilson's proposal to pan-Americanize it in the Pan American Scientific Congress of January 1916.¹³

4) Automatic economic sanctions to compel submission to pacific settlement. This was the central idea of the League to Enforce Peace.¹⁴ It grew out of Jefferson's effort in the Embargo of 1807, and Theodore Roosevelt's proposal in his Nobel prize address of 1910, for a union of the great powers in a "League of Peace." This idea, in the phraseology of the time, was designed to "put teeth into the Hague system."

5) An international procedure for changing the status quo peacefully. Wilson particularly emphasized this idea, in order to rectify inequities in the peace treaties and to balance the territorial guarantee. He proposed what might be called a procedure of international eminent domain.

6) The administration of disputed territories, especially colonial territories, by the League, as "successor to the Empires." This idea was contributed by General Smuts and had a background in the American Northwest Ordinance.

7) The expansion of international economic and social co-operation through coordination of the international unions. Paul Reinsch, American Ambassador to China, had discussed this idea in his book entitled *Public International Unions*, published in 1911.

8) The reservation of fundamental national rights, such as domestic jurisdiction, regional understandings, discretion in the use of armed force, and withdrawal from the League. This idea, inherent in the concept of sovereignty, was insisted upon by the Senate.

A study of Wilson's successive drafts of the Covenant throws light on the immediate sources of these ideas. In his first draft in the summer of 1918, utilizing ideas in the British Phillimore draft and in one by Colonel House, Wilson set forth the general

¹³ Green Hackworth, *Digest of International Law* (Washington 1943) vol. 5, p. 442; Notter (cited above, note 9) pp. 374 ff.

¹⁴ Bartlett (cited above, note 9) p. 26.

structure of the League (but without the Council), the concepts of compulsory pacific settlement and economic sanctions, and, as the key article, a territorial guarantee coupled with a procedure for peaceful change: "The Contracting Powers unite in guaranteeing to each other political independence and territorial integrity; but it is understood between them that such territorial readjustments, if any, as may in the future become necessary by reason of changes in present racial conditions and aspirations or present social and political relationships, pursuant to the principle of self-determination, and also such territorial readjustments as may, in the judgment of three-fourths of the Delegates be demanded by the welfare and manifest interest of the peoples concerned, may be effected, if agreeable to those peoples; and that territorial changes may in equity involve material compensation. The contracting powers accept without reservation the principle that peace of the world is superior in importance to every question of political jurisdiction or boundary."¹⁵

This provision, which gave the Assembly by a three-fourths vote a power of international eminent domain to transfer territories in the general interest, contingent upon a plebiscite in the area and payment of compensation to the ceding state, appeared also in Wilson's second and third drafts. It was criticized by Wilson's legal adviser, David Hunter Miller, but appeared in qualified form in the draft made by the latter and Lord Robert Cecil under date of January 20, 1919. It was omitted in Wilson's fourth draft of February 2, 1919, but reappeared in a separated and attenuated form, ultimately adopted in Articles 10 and 19 of the Covenant, in the Hurst-Miller draft, which was the foundation of the Covenant.¹⁶

In his second draft, made in Paris, January 10, 1919, Wilson added the Council to the Assembly as a major organ of the League, in accord with proposals by General Smuts, Lord Robert Cecil, and others, and also the mandates idea, set forth by General

¹⁵ Miller (cited above, note 5) vol. 2, pp. 12, 70, 99; also vol. 1, pp. 14 ff.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, vol. 2, pp. 70, 99, 106-07, 134, 146, 661, 666.

Smuts.¹⁷ Wilson, however, applied it not only to the Hapsburg and Turkish empires, as Smuts intended, but also to the German colonies.¹⁸ The reservations of national sovereignty, insisted upon by Senator Lodge and recommended by ex-President Taft, were inserted in the Covenant after Wilson's return to Paris following a brief sojourn in the United States in March 1919.¹⁹

The final draft of the Covenant contained all of these ideas: the basic structure, in Articles 1 to 7; obligations for pacific settlement, in Articles 12 to 15; general guarantee of territory and independence, called by Wilson the heart of the Covenant, in Article 10; economic sanctions to compel pacific settlement, in Articles 16 and 17; procedures for peaceful change, in Articles 11 and 19; mandates, in Article 22, supplementing provisions for the international administration of Danzig and the Saar Valley in other articles of the Versailles treaty; social and economic cooperation, in Articles 23 to 25; and the reservations of sovereignty in various articles—domestic jurisdiction (Art. 15, par. 8), Monroe Doctrine (Art. 21), withdrawal (Art. 2), and veto on the use of armed force (Art. 5, par. 1, and Art. 16, par. 2). Other provisions of the Covenant dealt with disarmament (Arts. 8, 9), treaty publicity (Art. 18), supremacy of Covenant obligations (Art. 20), and amendment of the Covenant (Art. 26).

III

Between Wilson's first expression of the idea that an association of nations is necessary, in the autumn of 1914, and the general ratification of the League of Nations Covenant, giving form to this idea, in January 1920, there was an interesting history, in which Wilson's thought, world events, American foreign policy,

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, vol. 2, pp. 23 ff. For other expressions of the idea see Quincy Wright, *Mandates Under the League of Nations* (Chicago 1930) pp. 18 ff.

¹⁸ Miller (cited above, note 5) vol. 1, pp. 34 ff.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, vol. 1, pp. 322 ff. See also Hackworth (cited above, note 13) vol. 5, p. 443, and Wilson's statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, August 19, 1919, in Heckscher (cited above, note 4) pp. 373 ff.

the foreign policy of other governments, and American and world opinion interacted upon one another. Wilson was especially concerned with American opinion, upon which his public addresses exerted a tremendous influence as American foreign policy moved from neutrality and freedom of the seas to mediation for peace and a war to establish a League of Nations.

In discussing the relations between a statesman's public utterances, personal convictions, appraisals of public sentiment, and actual decisions on foreign policy it is difficult to determine which are means and which are ends. There is always a suspicion that the public utterances of a statesman are rationalizations rather than reasons, that they fall short of complete candor and sincerity, that they are made to reflect what the public or the politicians want to hear or to persuade them to accept a policy or a decision compelled by circumstances or events, rather than to express the convictions of the speaker. The fact that a statesman speaks for a group, when speaking officially and publicly, necessarily leads to ambiguities in this regard. It is his duty to speak for his government or state, not for himself. He may voice principles or policies based on personal convictions somewhat beyond what the public now accepts, in the expectation that his utterances will lead the public to his views, but if he permits himself to express such convictions beyond the hope of such persuasion, he is likely to be retired from public life, rapidly in a democracy, more slowly in other forms of government.

In the case of a scholar like Wilson, accustomed in the classroom to express convictions resulting from his own study, public utterances doubtless tend to be closer to personal conviction than in the case of a professional politician, accustomed to express what he thinks the public wants to hear, or in the case of a lawyer, accustomed to speak in order to persuade a jury or to offer a judge legal justification for the decisions which his client desires. But Wilson had learned from his early reading of Burke and Bagehot that a statesman must permit his principles to evolve with increased experience and changing conditions. He also recognized

it as "the gospel of politics" that expediencies and compromises are necessary if political goals are to be realized.²⁰

Wilson was surrounded during the war by advisers who offered reasons for the policies they urged. Bryan, his first Secretary of State, believed in peace, democracy, and the force of Christian love, and when the price for maintaining peace after the Lusitania sinking seemed too great for Wilson to accept, Bryan resigned.²¹ Lansing, who succeeded him, felt that it was essential for American security that Germany be defeated, and urged entry into the war in the name of democracy. Wilson, however, was long uncertain that American security demanded entry into the war, and if it did, he doubted whether joining the Allies against Germany could be justified as a fight for democracy, at least so long as Russia was an autocracy and was on the Allied side.²² Page, Ambassador to Britain, felt the same as Lansing about security and democracy, but he felt strongly that closer Anglo-American solidarity was a value in itself and that violation of international law and humanity by the submarine was ample justification for entering the war against Germany. Wilson, however, appreciated that the Allies, as well as Germany, had been violating the traditional rules of international law. Furthermore, since international law left forms of government within the domestic jurisdiction of each state, to enter the war for both international law and democracy was hardly consistent.²³

Colonel House, who was Wilson's most trusted adviser, was impressed, though less than Lansing or Page, by the dangers to the United States of a German victory, but he was also impressed by the dangers to world stability, and eventually to the United States, if Germany were so completely destroyed that it could no longer act as a check on Russia. His discussions with British

²⁰ See Notter (cited above, note 9) pp. 16 ff., 29 ff., 83, 98 ff.

²¹ See Edward H. Buehrig, *Woodrow Wilson and the Balance of Power* (Bloomington, Indiana, 1955) pp. 125 ff.; Robert E. Osgood, *Ideals and Self-Interest in American Foreign Relations* (Chicago 1953) pp. 87, 93, 186, 203.

²² Buehrig, *op. cit.*, pp. 131 ff.; Osgood, *op. cit.*, pp. 163 ff.

²³ Osgood, *op. cit.*, pp. 154 ff.

Foreign Minister Grey convinced him, however, that unless the war could be ended by negotiation, with something less than complete victory for either side, the United States should enter on the Allied side, to restore the balance of power and to maintain it for the future by uniting British and American seapower to do the job that Britain could no longer do alone, as it had in the nineteenth century. This was, indeed, the concept of Sir Edward Grey in his proposal of September 1915, linking "freedom of the seas" with a "League of Nations" to end "militarism and navalism."²⁴ The League, set up as it was with economic sanctions involving seapower as its teeth and with dominant naval power controlled by Great Britain and the United States, could well be conceived as an elaborate system to accomplish this purpose. The insistence by Lord Balfour, after the United States had failed to enter, that this failure changed the League's character and made it impossible for Great Britain alone to shoulder the burden of Article 16, faced by the possibility that the United States would pursue a policy of freedom-of-the-seas neutrality, suggests that Great Britain had this conception of the League.²⁵

Wilson, though aware of the balance-of-power considerations pressed on him by House, and aware of the interpretation of the proposed League as a union of American and British seapower, which was much discussed in United States naval circles, did not espouse them: his aims were broader and, in addition, he doubted whether the American public, with its anti-British and isolationist sentiments, could be brought to accept an alliance with Britain or a balance-of-power concept. "Peace without victory," called for in his address to the Senate of January 22, 1917, reporting his efforts at mediation, accorded with the tradition of the Treaty of

²⁴ Buchrig, *op. cit.*, pp. 188 ff.; Osgood, *op. cit.*, pp. 160 ff.

²⁵ See Balfour's remarks in the League of Nations Council, August 2, 1920 (*Minutes*, p. 26), and his memorandum rejecting the Geneva Protocol, read in the Council by Austen Chamberlain, March 12, 1925; Alfred Zimmern, *The League of Nations and the Rule of Law, 1918-1936* (London 1936) pp. 302 ff., 257. See also F. P. Walters, *A History of the League of Nations* (London 1952) vol. 1, p. 73; William E. Rappard, *The Quest for Peace* (Cambridge, Mass., 1940) p. 242.

Ghent (1814) and seemed an acceptable way of saying that the balance of power should not be upset.²⁶ "Freedom of the seas" for everyone but the aggressor, called for in the second of his Fourteen Points of January 8, 1918, seemed more acceptable than an alliance; this principle, discussed by House and Grey, implied not neutrality but a League to prevent both navalism and militarism by maintaining peace.²⁷

It was from these various lines of advice, and from the changing exigencies of the situation he faced, that Wilson reached the conclusion that the League of Nations should be the central theme of American policy during and after the war. He reached this conclusion because, like Bryan, he wanted peace, and doubted whether democracy could survive without it. But he came to see that neutrality was not the answer in a shrinking world—even less an answer than it had been in the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic periods, when the policy of neutrality had led the young American republic into war, first with France (1798) and then with England (1812).²⁸ Neutrality had meant in American history freedom of the seas, or the right to trade with both belligerents, and in principle the limits of this right were defined by international law. Freedom of the seas therefore naturally became the first slogan of American policy on the outbreak of war in 1914. But as the war progressed and each side exerted itself, by blockade or by submarine sinkings, to destroy the trade of the other, it became clear that this slogan, as in 1812, would probably lead to war, through rising resentments of public opinion, and, as Wilson seems to have thought in regard to the earlier war, it might get us in on the wrong side.

To avoid such a development, Wilson, in demanding rights

²⁶ Heckscher (cited above, note 4) pp. 273 ff.; Buehrig, *op. cit.*, p. 260. See note 35, below. See also Padover (cited above, note 3) for Wilson's address to the Senate, January 22, 1917 (p. 72), in Manchester, England, December 30, 1918 (p. 100), in Los Angeles, September 20, 1919 (p. 104), and his letter of March 8, 1920 (p. 106); Osgood, *op. cit.*, pp. 172 ff., 189, 285.

²⁷ See the works cited above, as follows: Padover, p. 112; Buehrig, pp. 207 ff., 262 ff.; Notter, pp. 467 ff.

²⁸ See Osgood, *op. cit.*, pp. 188 ff.

under international law, had to make the distinction, which the public had made spontaneously, between violations of international law affecting only property—the British blockade—and those affecting human life—the submarine. Such a distinction, however, transferred the basis of American protest from law to humanity.²⁹ Furthermore, American opinion was coming to believe, under the stimulating writings of former President Theodore Roosevelt, that the invasion of Belgium was evidence of German aggression, that international law permitted discrimination between the aggressor and his victim when the latter's neutrality was guaranteed, as was Belgium's, and that the United States, as a party to the Hague Convention on Neutrality, was obliged to intervene.³⁰ Finally, the issue of democracy versus autocracy could not be wholly ignored, and certainly there was more democracy on the Allied side than on the German side.³¹

Through this process of criticizing the arguments of his principal advisers and following the inhibitions and demands of public opinion, Wilson finally became convinced that the League was the only solution, but not until he had attempted mediation to achieve a "peace without victory." Only after this had failed, following his reelection in 1916 on the slogan "He kept us out of war," and after Germany had renewed submarine warfare, was he prepared to move toward war, synthesizing the arguments of all his advisers in his war address of April 1917—the submarine barbarities, freedom of the seas (for all but the aggressor), democracy (strengthened by the recent Russian revolution), German

²⁹ See John Bassett Moore, *Principles of Diplomacy* (New York 1918) pp. 70 ff. Wilson is said to have remarked that he did not want to make the mistake made by the only other President from Princeton (Madison) of getting into war on the wrong side.

³⁰ In an article in *Outlook*, September 23, 1914, Theodore Roosevelt favored United States neutrality and detected no legal responsibility of the United States in respect to the invasion of Belgium, but in his book, *Fear God and Take Your Own Part* (New York 1916), published after the Lusitania incident, he found both legal and moral arguments for American intervention on the Belgium issue. See Osgood, pp. 135 ff., and Buehrig, pp. 160 ff. (both cited above, note 21).

³¹ For a summary of Wilson's attitude see Buehrig, *op. cit.*, pp. 108 ff., and Osgood, *op. cit.*, pp. 172 ff.

aggression (by the government, not the people), and, most of all, the necessity to establish a League of Nations to maintain future peace.³²

Dealing with this problem, Wilson exhibited the critical approach of the scholar skeptical of all extremes. This detachment enraged activists like Theodore Roosevelt, who more than anything else disliked indecision, and had no patience with a Hamlet, "sicklied o'er by the pale cast of thought." Wilson, unlike Hamlet, came to decisions, but only after much thought, and when he had reached a decision it was difficult to move him. It was because of the deliberation and ultimate deep conviction behind his decisions that he gained the reputation for stubbornness. His deliberation, in balancing considerations while maturing his judgment, was a significant feature of his personality as a statesman.³³

He resisted the excessive subjectivity of appraising complicated entities by simple value dichotomies, as in identifying the Allies with democracy and Germany with autocracy, and also the excessive objectivity of appraising entities in terms of current performance, as in judging the belligerents in terms of immediate American interest. He desired neither a crusade for democracy nor a renunciation of interest in democracy, and thus he adopted the League not to make the world democratic but "to make the world safe for democracy," as well as for other forms of government. In his opinion, the form of a state's government was a domestic matter for each to decide for itself, but he believed that nations would eventually decide for democracy if assured against aggression. Democracy could, he thought, grow only by discussion in a peaceful world, not by military crusading.

Wilson was enough of a philosopher to doubt whether in a rapidly changing world the traditional analysis of American

³² See Heckscher (cited above, note 4) pp. 273 ff.

³³ The criteria for analyzing Wilson's personality applied in the following paragraphs follow those proposed by the writer for analyzing national character; see Quincy Wright, *The Study of International Relations* (New York 1955) pp. 551 ff. Notter (cited above, note 9) documents these characteristics in detail.

policy, in the concrete terms of Washington's Farewell Address and the Monroe Doctrine, was adequate, but he was enough of a historian to doubt, with Edmund Burke, whether wise policy could be deduced from abstract principles of peace, democracy, and justice. Hence he favored a League that would be a "disentangling alliance" and a "Monroe Doctrine of the world," thus combining tradition and reason, the concrete and the abstract.³⁴

He resisted the emotional activism of Theodore Roosevelt, who demanded military preparedness and vigorous action to liberate Belgium and to stop the submarine outrages, because he thought it put emotion before reason, neglected the genuine goals of policy, and overlooked the need for balance, likely to be upset by total victory of one side, especially the need for a strong Germany to check Russia. But he also resisted the intellectualism that would substitute theory for action, understanding for commitment, reason for power, because history told him that in international affairs the strong had often devoured the weak. He was not unaware of the dangers of German victory, continually brought to his attention by Page, Lansing, and House. Consequently, like Pascal, he proposed to combine force and justice in a League of Nations.³⁵

Wilson's liberalism kept him from identifying the national interest with the territory and other material assets of the nation,³⁶ but his conservatism kept him from identifying it with the welfare of all humanity. So he sought to identify it with a League to protect the particular interests of each and the general interests of all.

³⁴ See Padover (cited above, note 3) for Wilson's address in Arlington, Virginia, May 30, 1916 (p. 11), to the Senate, January 22, 1917 (p. 71), in New York, March 4, 1919 (p. 120).

³⁵ Wilson espoused the preparedness movement reluctantly, and refused to identify a particular nation as its objective; see Osgood (cited above, note 21) pp. 205 ff. Frank Cobb has related that in a talk with Wilson, on the eve of his war message, the President was worn down with doubts and feared Germany would be so beaten that the peace would be dictated and disastrous; see Buehrig (cited above, note 21) p. 264. See also note 26, above.

³⁶ See his Mobile address, October 27, 1913, in Heckscher (cited above, note 4) pp. 203 ff.

He particularly resisted the excessive "realism" of a policy guided only by "national interests" without regard for the interests of others, urged by both isolationists and interventionists, but he also resisted the uncritical "idealism" of Bryan's "peace at any price," which subsumed the interests of all in a universal principle to be observed in all circumstances without regard to consequences. Consequently he urged a League of Nations that would promote peace by uniting the force of all to preserve the territory and independence of each.

He had too much religion and faith in humanity to accept a fatalism stifling to human effort and reform, but he had too much scientific sophistication to assume that progress is inevitable or that good ideas can realize themselves without appropriate means. Thus he wanted a League with teeth, able to implement high purposes by political means.

The League of Nations thus appeared the middle road, and after he had become convinced that war could not be avoided it seemed the objective most likely to win American opinion for war and most likely to win world opinion for a just peace in the Conference.

American opinion was confused. It seemed unwilling to accept alliance with Britain, because of the traditions of 1776 and 1812, not to mention the special attitude of citizens of Irish and German origin, or to accept defeat for Britain, because of fear of expanding Germany and appreciation, perhaps unconscious, that power must be checked and balanced. Opinion was increasingly insistent that Germany must be punished because of the submarine sinkings, but also insistent that there should be an ideal cause for war higher than mere resentment at injury. Freedom, peace, democracy, and American traditions, especially Washington's Farewell Address and the Monroe Doctrine, were plus slogans in American history and opinion. Wilson's addresses from May 1916 to April 1917 merged freedom of the seas into economic sanctions against aggression; the equity of neutral mediation into evidence of German aggressiveness after mediation had been rejected; the

Monroe Doctrine and opposition to "entangling alliances" into the idea of the League of Nations; and finally, "peace without victory" into war to suppress aggression and to establish a League to "make the world safe for democracy" by assuring peace and security for all. By these syntheses he won overwhelming acceptance of war.

Wilson continued the same themes during the war and during the negotiations with the Central Powers leading to the Armistice, convincing the peoples, and in less degree the governments, of Europe that his middle way was the best way.

American and world opinion supported the merging of the treaty with the League, the latter serving both as an instrument for its execution and improvement and as a goal justifying the war effort. There were compromises in the treaty, but it cannot be demonstrated that if the United States had ratified the treaty the Wilsonian theory would not have worked. The European powers might have adhered more completely to its principles. Reparation demands might have been moderated. The world economy might have been strengthened. The Ruhr invasion, the depression of the German middle class, and the rise of Hitler might not have occurred. Russian communism might have been moderated. The great depression of 1930 might not have occurred. Japan's Manchurian adventure might have been prevented or suppressed. Mussolini without Hitler's support and Japan's precedent might not have grabbed for the Ethiopian empire. It is idle to speculate on historical might-have-beens, but American opinion long after the event, manifested in its enthusiastic acceptance of the United Nations and in numerous scholarly and historical analyses, suggests that if the United States had entered the League the world might have enjoyed a long period of peace and prosperity under the leadership of the Atlantic powers. In such circumstances self-determination might have proceeded with less rapidity in Asia and Africa. Russian and Chinese experiments in rapid industrialization through dictatorial governmental control might have proceeded more

slowly. It is certain that history would have been different. History has confirmed Wilson's prediction that American rejection of the League would result in another world war.³⁷

IV

Wilson's struggle with the Senate was, in the light of these considerations, a momentous historic event. The factors resulting in his failure were numerous: partisan desire by Republicans to deflate the Democratic president and party; traditional Senate jealousy of presidential power; sincere conviction by some, perhaps the fourteen Senate "bitter enders," that isolationism was a sound policy; confusion of public opinion over reservations (were they significant or merely political?); the natural tendency of people to withdraw from responsibility after the exertions of war; Wilson's illness and the weakness of Democratic leadership without him. The complex working of these factors has often been narrated.³⁸ The suggestion that Wilson's stubbornness killed his own treaty is not sustainable. There is sufficient evidence that the initial success of the method of killing the treaty by reservations, mentioned in correspondence between Senators Lodge and Watson, had convinced the Republican leadership that the treaty could be killed and opinion could be exploited to Republican victory in 1920, using the argument with the internationalists that an "association" better than the League could be

³⁷ See the references in note 25, above. In his Jackson Day letter of January 8, 1920, Wilson wrote: "The maintenance of the peace of the world and the effective execution of the treaty depend upon the whole-hearted participation of the United States. . . . If we keep out of this agreement, if we do not give our guaranties, then another attempt will be made to crush the new nations of Europe," and in his Omaha address, September 8, 1919, he predicted "with absolute certainty that within another generation there will be another world war if the nations of the world do not concert the method by which to prevent it"; see Padover (cited above, note 3) pp. 126, 129. Thomas A. Bailey, in *Woodrow Wilson and the Great Betrayal* (New York 1945), gives some attention to these historical might-have-beens, in his final chapter.

³⁸ See Bailey (*op. cit.*, p. 275), who blames Wilson for advising the Democratic Senators not to accept the Lodge reservations; Denna F. Fleming, *The United States and the League of Nations, 1918-1920* (New York 1932); Bartlett (cited above, note 9) pp. 167 ff.

framed, and with the isolationists that the League was dead.³⁹ In this the Republicans outguessed Wilson, who hoped that a "solemn referendum" in 1920 would bring victory for the League.

The event was disastrous. The League went through a period of hopeful development for ten years, but the sense of dissatisfaction in Central Europe and Japan, the rise of fascism and communism, the loss of faith and energy in the West, and the great depression brought problems in the 1930s that the League was unable to face. The combination of aggression and appeasement led to World War II, while American opinion, seeking a more isolated neutrality than ever, made it impossible for even the pro-League administration of Franklin Roosevelt and Cordell Hull to undo the disastrous turn given to opinion in the 1920s. Not until after the outbreak of World War II and the great struggle between the "Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies" and the "America First Committee" had been won by the former did American opinion change.⁴⁰ Perhaps it was too late. The world, polarized by hostile ideologies, was less adapted to achieving a successful League in 1945 than it had been in 1920.

It is true that nationalism is now stronger than ever, urging self-determination in the underdeveloped territories, Titoism in the Soviet satellites, and national protectionism in the Western countries. It is also true that the opposite spirit of cosmopolitanism is demanded by the vulnerability of all peoples to annihilation by atomic war, and also by renewal of their faith in liberty, equality, and fraternity. Such a faith is manifested in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in the work of the Specialized Agencies, and in the concern for human welfare and social justice professed, if not always practiced, by all states.

The synthesis of these opposing movements, by which peoples actually identify themselves with their nations but are urged by their ideals and their necessities to identify themselves with mankind, though difficult is not, I think, impossible. The routes of

³⁹ James E. Watson, *As I Knew Them* (Indianapolis 1936) pp. 190-91.

⁴⁰ See Walter Johnson, *The Battle Against Isolation* (Chicago 1944).

imperialism and internationalism are both being pursued to effect this synthesis—the one by the Soviets' attempt at hegemony, by the more democratic American system of regional alliances, and by the efforts of Western European states to retain the remnants of overseas empires; the other by the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies, based on the "sovereign equality" of states and facilitating the voluntary cooperation of all nations to realize collective security, self-determination of peoples, universal respect for human rights, and social and economic progress.

Today we can only hope that the great idea vivified by Woodrow Wilson, which pointed the way to such an internationalism, will be realized through the United Nations established in his spirit on the initiative of Franklin D. Roosevelt and Cordell Hull. The United Nations itself, with the help of universities and the international-minded minority, may eventually educate peoples, nations, and governments to attitudes and opinions capable of sustaining it, and of permitting it to synthesize the plurality of many coexisting states with the unity necessary for human survival and progress, thus reconciling the political values of men with the conditions of the atomic age.⁴¹

Whatever may be the outcome, it seems clear that Wilson's pragmatism sustained his confidence in the ultimate triumph of his cause. The principles of the League would, he was sure, gain support with experience, even the experience of another world war, which he foretold. Commenting, shortly before his death, on the defeat of the Covenant, he told two close friends that he was not sorry he had broken down, because if he had obtained ratification of the Covenant it would have been a personal triumph but the people would not have been ready for the League. "As it is coming now," he said, "the American people are thinking their way through and reaching their free decision. That would be the better way for it to come."⁴²

⁴¹ See Quincy Wright, *Problems of Stability and Progress in International Relations* (Berkeley 1955) pp. 36-37.

⁴² Edith Bolling Wilson, *My Memoir* (Indianapolis 1938) p. 344, and Bailey (cited above, note 37) p. 349.

THE INTERPLAY OF CAPITALISM AND SOCIALISM IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY*

BY EDUARD HEIMANN

BY SOCIALISM I mean the historical movement of protest against economic disorder and social injustice in capitalism.¹ A discussion of its role in the United States divides logically into two parts: in the first place, why there was not, and is not, in this country socialism in its typical form; and secondly, what then has

* AUTHOR'S NOTE—I wish to dedicate this essay to the memory of my dear friend Siegfried Marck. It is based on a lecture first presented in the Universities of Hamburg and Bonn and later, in the present revised form, in the General Seminar of the New School's Graduate Faculty. It is here published by agreement with J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) in Tübingen, who is simultaneously publishing the German version, "Was Amerika aus dem Sozialismus gemacht hat," in the *Hamburger Jahrbuch für Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftspolitik*, vol. 2 (1957).

¹ The confusion in the use of the words economic system, socialism, and the like, to which the present writer has contributed his full share, may lead the reader to expect something very different from the discussion here presented. A pure, uniform economic system based on one sole principle of organization cannot be imagined even in theory, far less exist in reality, and at any rate every capitalist market economy must rest on a more or less extended public economy of quite different structure and must be limited and supplemented by it. This fundamental dualism of economic principles within one body economic has been explored in all directions by Hans Ritschl; his books are rich in ideas and also vigorous in polemical defense. Public economy is now the institutional definition of socialism, and the TVA in the United States is just as bitterly decried as socialism as were the railroads in Bismarck's Germany. It would be a rewarding task to describe the interplay in the American economy of "capitalism" and "socialism" in the sense of institutions of market economy and public economy, for the public sector on federal, state, and municipal levels is really very significant, far more than is usually assumed; moreover, such an analysis would focus attention on unique American achievements (for example, the eighty or so national and state parks, often of very large dimensions, have withheld the most scenic places of the country from commercial exploitation and, particularly in the Western states, have created model arrangements for the enjoyment and recreation of the less well-to-do). But an analysis of "capitalism" and "socialism" in this sense is entirely outside the purposes of the present discussion.

become of the movement of protest, on the one hand, and of capitalism, on the other hand. The conventional assumption that socialism simply evaporated in the American climate is as fallacious as the opposite political slogan of creeping socialism in the United States. To anticipate the result of the present analysis: two mighty rivers unite for still greater power in their common course, but their waters remain distinguishable by color and speed far down the river bed.

I²

The general reason for the United States' deviation from the typical European course of events is the absence of feudal tradition, still more generally, the absence of a closed society.³ This country entered life as a bourgeois society (despite the well known qualification concerning the South). Hence standards of rank in society are unknown, most of all standards concerning what befits the lower classes. If in England twenty years ago a highly educated and sensitive person like Virginia Woolf could lament that cultured life becomes impossible if the servants no longer know their places (the same expression that the American South uses in speaking of the Negroes), such a sentiment is alien to bourgeois America. There may indeed be a thousand capitalistic interests in holding the wage level down, but nothing in the fundamental structure of the country prevents a rise of wages when it is technically possible. In the feudalistic atmosphere of Europe, Malthus, Ricardo, and Marx summoned up all their

² The present phase of American business life is discussed, with many interesting details, by Adolf A. Berle, Jr., *The 20th Century Capitalist Revolution* (New York 1954); John Maurice Clark, *The Ethical Basis of Economic Freedom*, two lectures published by the Kazanjian Economics Foundation (Westport, Conn., 1955); Peter F. Drucker, *The Concept of the Corporation*, an analysis of General Motors (New York 1946); J. Kenneth Galbraith, *American Capitalism, The Concept of Countervailing Power* (Boston 1952); George W. Stocking and Myron W. Watkins, *Monopoly and Free Enterprise*, Twentieth Century Fund (New York 1951). See also my contributions to the periodical *Kyklos*, 1956, no. 4, and 1957, no. 1.

³ Edgar Salin, "Industrielle Revolution," in *Kyklos* (1956) pp. 299 ff., draws the same distinction between the United States and Europe.

acumen to make special peculiarities of the labor market responsible for the lag of wages behind rising productivity and for the ensuing increase of profit; that wages lag appeared natural to them. The opposite appeared natural to the American Carey (and incidentally to Adam Smith, the herald of economic harmony).

The vastness and emptiness of the country prevented the freezing of the social stratification. One may put this factor in the first place; Marx and Sombart have done so, Marx in order to explain the possibility of evading exploitation, Sombart to explain the failure of proletarian socialism in the United States.⁴ But then it would be consistent to suspect that the closing of the frontier, the exhaustion of the land supply, must produce a new feudality, while in reality the frontier spirit of adventure continues to keep society open.

In the same context must we understand the absence of those moral and aesthetic inhibitions to the pursuit of efficiency which are peculiar to feudalism. The pursuit of efficiency as a supreme good demands ever renewed experimenting and organizing, directing and redirecting of people on the basis of business accounting, that is, a maximum of physical and mental mobility combined with exclusive concentration of all energy on the one point. Scientific orientation and rationalization are important elements in the rise of the bourgeoisie; feudalism cannot stand up to them, because it attributes its own existence to religious sanction. Bourgeois America is not only free of such inhibitions but is confirmed in its attitude by a different set of religious principles.

Hence it is only here that bourgeois capitalism found a really free development, that its achievement could unfold in full. Only here have the economic laws become, to a certain extent, the laws of social development; only here has the liberal promise of rising prosperity for all been put to the test of verification. The

⁴ In general theory Franz Oppenheimer, in many books published during the first three decades of this century, presented the proposition that a free-market economy without an open frontier produces the class society known as capitalism, while a free-market economy in combination with an open frontier produces the "community of the free and equal," in which wages can rise indefinitely.

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unmistakable result is that reality has exceeded the promise. Poverty has been conquered, as a matter of principle; there is no tenable economic reason for its continuance in the "economy of abundance," while it obviously was unavoidable in the "economy of scarcity" of the past. The unique achievement of the United States in world history consists in having unlocked the sources and awakened the forces that made an economy of abundance of the economy of scarcity. In the perspective of world history, which may be too quietistic, one may perhaps say that in so far as there are still pockets of poverty, these are natural in view of the unavoidable unevenness of such a rapid transformation; and they, too, will be drawn into the further upward trend. But it is more important to state that such a persistence of poverty is usually caused not by economic but by sociological factors, in the first place by local tendencies in racial relations. The Negroes are America's proletarians—but obviously this is not an economic proposition.

Schumpeter's well known prognosis of the capitalist future, from 1942, started from the figures of 1928, the year before the big crash, that is, the top point reached until then. From 1870 to 1928 the production of consumption goods showed an average rise of 2 percent a year, compounded—interruptions through depressions notwithstanding (J. M. Clark, in his *Ethical Basis of Economic Freedom*, uses the same rate of growth). By projecting this rate of growth from 1928 through the next fifty years, and assuming at the same time that in this period the population rises by one-third, from 120 to 160 million, Schumpeter found that the average real income per head would be doubled after the fifty years. But if we confront this prognosis with the figures of the real development to 1955-56, we find that the per capita share of consumption income has increased by almost 60 percent during these 27 years, although the formidable shrinkage of the 1930s is taken into account, and although the population figure, the divisor, has risen much more rapidly than Schumpeter assumed, in that it had already reached 165 million in 1956 instead

of only 160 million in 1978. For a full appreciation of the figures we must further take it into consideration that, roughly speaking, production would have grown correspondingly more if it had not been for the simultaneous radical shortening of the work week. And, finally, the improvement of the qualities of cheap commodities eludes any statistical estimate but adds a further weighty increment to economic welfare.

The figures are astonishing not only in themselves; they are still more remarkable in view of the conviction held by both liberalism and Marxism that monopoly is a fetter on productivity. The overwhelming weight of giant enterprises in the incredibly productive American economy is indisputable. The theory, however, asserts that productivity is promoted only by competition and is hamstrung by monopoly, because the latter draws its profits with impunity from the exploitation of the consumers abandoned to it. From this argument the liberals inferred that the thing to do is to prohibit or break up the monopolies; the Marxists inferred that it is the proletarians alone who can save productivity from monopoly capitalism and hence they must seize power. All this is obsolete in the presence of the figures. Almost fifty years ago Schumpeter pointed out that progress is systematized and individualized in the big enterprises, and that it is, of course, the strongest enterprises which support the largest and best laboratories. One can go beyond this and maintain quite generally that the contrasts between monopoly and competition on the one hand, and between static and dynamic mentality on the other hand, do not coincide at all, that there has always been, and is today, static competition, and that this is the age of dynamic monopolies.⁵ Unless the indications are completely misleading, productivity is rising more rapidly today than ever before—and what about the course it will take when automation is applied more generally?

Now the above figures are averages—an always hazardous cate-

⁵ See Eduard Heimann, *Wirtschaftssysteme und Gesellschaftssysteme* (Tübingen 1954) p. 22.

gory. They do not say that welfare increases in point of fact, but only that there is room for it to increase. Within this room everything depends on distribution. But here a mere theoretical consideration may put us at ease, to a certain extent. It is hardly possible to imagine economic conditions in which, in a unified society as distinguished from the world market, the top of the pyramid of incomes rises alone without affecting the basis, thus making the pyramid higher and narrower. When profits accrue at the top they can be employed only for the purchase of more commodities and services, or for additional investment goods, in both cases causing the demand for labor to rise, that is, causing the new profits to flow down the sides of the pyramid. The result will be that the pyramid is restored to its former shape, but its place has moved upward. The relative positions of the different strata remain unchanged, but the absolute amounts of incomes are larger for each, because the increment is redistributed from the top down, more or less proportionately. Thereby, however, the situation is decisively changed. When total income is stationary, one group can gain only at the expense of others, and all attention concentrates on the battle for the shares, which jeopardizes the cohesion of society. Contrariwise, when the total is steadily rising, without sociologically fixed walls between compartments, all are gaining, and attention shifts from the comparison of one's own income with that of others to the progress from last year through this year to next year. And this, in point of fact, is the liberal promise, except that it materializes precisely under monopoly.

The proposition of unchanged relative income distribution within a growing total has been established by Pareto; he used doubtful statistical methods, but the proposition is independent of those methods and perfectly plausible in itself. Hence it is a kind of statistical sensation that, in opposition to the Marxist theory of "relatively increasing misery" and the Paretian theory of stable relative income distribution, Simon Kuznets, the greatest living authority in this field, recently demonstrated that income

differences have shrunk over the last years and decades.⁶ And this is true even of gross incomes, that is, before progressive taxes further reduce the distances. Kuznets found that in the United States the wealthiest 20 percent received 55 percent of total incomes in 1929, that is, before the crash, but that in the average of the years 1944, 1946, 1947, and 1950 their share had shrunk to 44 percent (to repeat: before income taxes); the share of the wealthiest 5 percent was reduced from 31 to 20 percent. Still more interesting are the figures for the United Kingdom, because they go much farther back. The wealthiest 5 percent received no less than 43 percent of the total in 1880, the wealthiest 5 percent of 1947 only 24 percent. The German figures are not well marked, and one may perhaps suspect that they tend rather the other way, even recently. But the figures for the United States and England are so striking that even a technical critique of details is not likely to make a substantial difference in the result. Incomes rise and differences of incomes diminish.⁷

The second main target of socialist criticism has been, for many years, the disorder and insecurity in capitalism, the constant menace of unemployment, which destroys any plan for the future of the person and the family. But here, too, a fundamental change has taken place. As early as 1910 the best of the Marxist economists, Rudolf Hilferding, refuted (in *Das Finanzkapital*, p. 295) the Marxist theory of the necessary collapse of capitalism in the economic crisis. According to Hilferding, to avoid the crisis nothing is required but that the business community recognize the competitive search for short-term profit as too dangerous, because it would plunge them all into the crisis. As they would

⁶ Simon Kuznets, "Economic Growth and Income Inequality," in *American Economic Review*, vol. 45 (March 1955) p. 4.

⁷ Moreover, Siegfried Landshut, "Die Gegenwart im Lichte der Marxschen Lehre," in *Hamburger Jahrbuch für Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftspolitik*, vol. 1 (1956), is very right in maintaining that the per capita income of the gainfully employed is less important for the people's livelihood than the total income per household, to which surely more members contribute today than fifty or a hundred years ago, although figures are not available. This consideration reinforces the above argument on the unification of the pattern of life.

learn if they experienced the crisis, their long-range business interest in the stabilization of the system, that is, of their ruling position, requires that they establish the correct proportion between their total investments and the total purchasing power for consumption goods paid out by them in the form of wages; they would learn that this requirement rests not on moral but on purely business reasons. Marx had assumed that the "proletarians" alone can understand the necessity of long-range concerted action for industrial stabilization, because their class interest foists solidarity upon them and no private property interests separate them from one another; according to Hilferding's theory and the experience of all countries in the last decades, no such proletarian monopoly exists. In general theory one can say that if "maximization of profits" is the maxim of business policy, the brevity or length of the period for the figuring of the maximum remains undecided, and thus that long-range rationality fits in perfectly.⁸

Translated from theory into American practice, this means once more that the pragmatic mind of the country removes inhibitions if in the era of long-range investments "good business" requires considerations of long-range market tendencies. When the Roosevelt administration came to power in the crisis-shaken country, in 1933, it proclaimed that democratic cooperation was now called upon to deliver the goods in competition with Soviet coercion. A short time later the Republican industrialist, Paul Hoffman, founded the Committee for Economic Development, which was soon joined by several million businessmen, for the promotion of long-range business policy in a framework agreed upon by them, if possible without governmental interference; and here, too, the Russian alternative was explicitly referred to. Especially in the transition from the war economy to the peace economy the Committee rendered important services. The responsibility of democracy, and that is of the business community as well as the government, for stability and full employment has thus been

⁸ See Eduard Heimann, *Vernunftglaube und Religion in der modernen Gesellschaft* (Tübingen 1955) Chapter 5.

recognized, and was explicitly confirmed by the Eisenhower administration as it declared its readiness to stop any emerging danger with all available means of tax and budget policy.

In the context of business-cycle policy, wages assume decisive importance: insufficient purchasing power because of insufficient wages would cause a crisis, as profits would not be used for consumption. But even without any problems of business cycles, it is obvious that mass production, the great democratic contribution of American industry, demands mass consumption: low wages can be justified only in times of capital shortage. In the sociologically unencumbered American economy, with its wealth of capital, wages have long since shown a rising tendency, and nobody doubts this necessity in principle, in view of mass production, even though the wage and cost level of the individual industry always remains, of course, a bone of contention; the atmosphere of democracy, with its trust and joy in growth, is propitious to wage demands. Truck drivers occasionally make more money than professors (we can only wish that our work were always as reliable and useful as theirs), steel workers make \$5000 to \$6000, automobile workers a little less; and in addition, social insurance serves as a cushion of purchasing power in case of danger. Henry Ford has coined the slogan that all this is "good business," or, in academic jargon, rational in an economic society free of feudalistic notions.

The same phrase of approval is not applicable without hesitation to the very far-reaching change occurring in the atmosphere of the industrial plant and shop as it becomes clear that the degree of efficiency is not influenced by external conditions alone but also by emotions and experiences of private life, such as marriage, family, and religion. Light, ventilation, and noise are undoubtedly among the responsibilities of the plant, and the forms of wage payments, naturally, are principal elements in the employment contract. But how far the sponsorship of management should go in psychological advice, the cure of souls, is an altogether different question. One can say that in such attempts a

new tendency toward feudalization steals surreptitiously into American society, starting from the consideration that man is always a whole and that hence the plant's efficiency can be increased by entirely absorbing and disciplining him—until finally the illicit meddling produces the opposite. Anyway, this development has veered 180 degrees within the last fifty years, from the attempt of the system named for the engineer Taylor, which divided man into his individual limbs and ascertained for each of them separately the optimal motion in mechanical work, to the production of "peace of mind" as a kind of lubricant. Clearly, the limit of the legitimate science of labor is reached at some point on this road, where respect for the integrity of the person commands a stop.

One cannot be grateful enough, however, for the positive achievements of the science of labor, industrial psychology and sociology, and their application to industrial relations. They have moved what used to be abandoned to the arbitrary rule of managers and foremen into the light of reason, and have thereby decisively changed the technical and moral conditions of labor. Morally everything depends on whether the conditions are imposed from above, without appeal, or are obtained with the cooperation and approval of the highly qualified experts of the unions, who find them logical in the framework of the production program. Hence this moral change is at the same time a change of the constitutional set-up in the plant. Under the old dispensation of anonymous market relations, labor, like any other merchandise, belonged to the buyer to use it at will—a relation of dominance in disguise, as defined by Marx and elaborated by Karl Renner and Hugo Sinzheimer. Under the new regime the production process is organized by both sides in partnership, and is watched by the representatives of labor. This is a new principle: the exemption of labor from the market in the strict sense of the word.

Some of the innovations may be listed here. A formerly contentious point, job evaluation, the ascertaining of the correct place

of the individual job in the structure of responsibilities and corresponding wage claims, has been removed from dispute, the experts and engineers of the two sides taking care of it in mutual agreement. Piece wages, long praised by employers as a stimulus and suspected by workers as a means of wage pressure for any work not exceeding the average, have likewise been removed from the sphere of dominance and the atmosphere of battle. In addition, the opinion seems to be gaining ground that the concentration of attention on the hour-by-hour reward impairs the quality of performance in the longer run, and that it is more efficacious and more dignified to pay a decent time wage for a decent performance and leave stimulation to the natural instinct for such a decent performance. Wage rises and promotion to higher functions take place no longer on the basis of personal favor but on the basis of age, seniority, and the like, in accordance with rules carefully worked out by both sides. Some enterprises experiment to their great satisfaction with "utility men" and "relief men" who substitute for the worker in case of indisposition, or permit him to leave his job for a few minutes of rest, a snack, a coffee break, so the process of work goes on but the worker is not tied to the machine but can move about freely. Old-age pensions have long been demanded by the unions, to be accumulated from annual payments by industry during the man's active years, as a machine is written off in annual rates. A trained mind naturally understands that, since the payments are a charge to industry from the man's employment, they are nothing but a part of the wage in a special form; without them the proper wage could be correspondingly higher, precisely as in the case of the contributions to social insurance. But it is remarkable that the payments, coming as they do from the firms alone, go to a fund administered by the unions alone. Finally, the machinery for conciliation and arbitration is highly developed in the framework of collective labor contracts. A well known example is the structure of lower and higher boards of conciliation in the River Rouge plant of the Ford works, which employs 80,000 workers and had earlier

been a seat of constant unrest; should all attempts at conciliation fail, the Dean of the Law School of Yale University pronounces a binding award.

II⁹

After all this, the conclusion seems to suggest itself that American capitalism has stolen the show from socialism, because disorder and injustice are being cured and nothing will remain to protest against. As ingenious a thinker as Professor Adolf Berle seems to imply this when he speaks of the "twentieth-century capitalist revolution" in the title of his recent book—as if a ruling system ever would or could make a revolution against itself. How is one to understand this? In point of fact, the possibilities of a bourgeois order free of feudalistic inhibitions have been realized only by democracy, under the pressure of labor. Lujo Brentano in 1872 undertook to prove that the pressure of the "guilds of labor of the present" would integrate the workers into bourgeois society. It is more correct to say that the conflict between capitalism and socialism has been overarched and settled by democracy—a true synthesis in the Hegelian mode of thought. Just as Soviet Russia cannot be thought of, either in the positive or in the negative, and either in theory or in reality, without the model of Western capitalism—the antithesis of the thesis—so American democracy cannot be thought of without the Soviet menace; this was explicitly attested by Franklin Roosevelt and Paul Hoffman in the decisive moment. In other words, capitalism and labor could not be reconciled without both of them changing.

The technical form in which labor was integrated into the new structure has been described by Galbraith as "countervailing

⁹ The present state and tendencies of labor-union policy and industrial relations are reviewed in a comprehensive survey in the first part of the monumental work by André Philip, *Démocratie industrielle* (Paris 1955). The systematic idea of my presentation is worked out in my book, *Soziale Theorie des Kapitalismus, Theorie der Sozialpolitik* (Tübingen 1929), which is antiquated in historical details. See also Selig Perlman, *A Theory of the Labor Movement* (New York 1928).

power." This is by no means limited to labor but is applicable anywhere between seller and buyer, between raw material and processing, between farming and wholesale trade, between successive stages of production, and the like. It all depends on opposing to the power on one side of the market an equally strong power on the other side: one monopoly or monopoly-like bargainer to the other. What then results is a peculiar equilibrium between them, not unlike the directly opposite equilibrium in free competition—in so far as we focus attention on the proportion of power between the partners. The decisive difference between monopoly and competition lies in the fact that competition lowers price to cost; but equilibrium between the powerful may very well raise wage cost on the one hand and prices on the other hand, at the expense of final consumers—leaving open indeed the question whether it is precisely the large-scale production characteristic of monopoly which reduces cost and even price in favor of consumers below the competitive level, in case the particular industry permits of organization in small competing units at all. At any rate, the power of the sellers in the labor market is formidable in many industries: the steel workers' union counts 1.2 million members and disposes of many millions of dollars; the still more numerous automobile workers amassed within a short time, and more or less secretly, a special strike fund of 25 million dollars for the battle for the "guaranteed wage."

Thus the principle of the political-social structure of American democracy—the separation of complementary powers depending on and checking one another—has been enriched by a new and significant application: besides legislative and executive power, federal, state, and municipal government, free enterprise and government intervention, there is now the pair big business and big labor (big agriculture is a third link). It is important to keep in mind that the initiative for this enrichment and completion in rapidly changing circumstances lay with democracy, not with labor. To repeat, before the 1930s the power of labor was indeed existent, but only as a menace; it was not organized in

the heavy industries (apart from a few scattered and weak craft unions among the huge numbers of semiskilled workers). Not until the Roosevelt administration was it given a legal form and function (Section 7 of the National Industrial Recovery Act) and invited to organize in order to take possession of the new form, thereby creating its countervailing power—a unique event, without parallel anywhere else in the Western world.

There had long been powerful labor unions in the old industries—printing, textile, garment, and building trades—but they did not properly represent countervailing power, because their opponents most often were medium-size and small shops rather than a concentrated economic power. It was precisely for this reason that the organizations of labor gained a foothold in these fields relatively early, while they remained forcibly suppressed in the powerful enterprises of modern big industry right into the 1930s. It is the old unions of the old splintered-up industries in which American labor had its first experience and developed its ideas. Relatively early, too, it found its Brentano in Professor Selig Perlman, who in 1928 with astonishing sagacity summarized those experiences and aspirations in a “theory of the labor movement”; this program has been faithfully followed ever since by the old unions as well as the new, at that time not yet born.

In the center of the program stands the unions’ “control of the jobs,” which is approximately synonymous with ownership in the jobs: an exclusive control of labor conditions, hiring and firing, and the like by the unions’ representatives in the shops. There can of course be no union control of the job unless capital equipment and management are organized differently; in other words, management and capital risk are left to the entrepreneurs. Labor property and capital property are inextricably interlocked, like legislative and executive power; neither can exist without the other.

The system thus presents itself as a partnership, as a kind of sharing of ownership rights, as industrial solidarity, where the responsibility on the labor side consists in guaranteeing the

dependability of the work done and, to this end, exerting a rigorous supervision over the members assigned to the jobs. The corresponding rights and practical gains of labor were presented above. And it has already been pointed out too that the community of interests not only means quality and volume of output but easily degenerates into an alliance for the exploitation of consumers. It has correctly been said that the development of the currency value is determined not so much by Federal Reserve policy as by the wage deals in the leading industries—a formidable power of which its holders are hardly aware, and thus their responsibility for the monetary effects of their decisions does not always enter their consciousness. The well intended warning that inflation would deprive the workers of their gains in wages is untenable in such generality. The members of a strong industry may raise their wages before other prices rise proportionately, and thus enjoy an intermediate gain; the devil takes only the hindmost, the members of weak industries and the unorganized and unorganizable. This is the gloomy reverse side of the system of countervailing power, that is, of industrial solidarity.

Even so, industrial solidarity need not of necessity be a breach of class solidarity. That it is is the usual assumption because it is plausible to say that, since profits obviously continue to exist, wages can rise only at the expense of other workers and consumers—the above case. But this is true without qualification only within an unchanged total. In the reality of the general upward movement one can imagine that the wage rise in one industry draws other industries into the movement, with the result that the total increment of goods is absorbed by wage movements, not evenly and simultaneously, it is true, but still relatively rapidly, in one “round” of wage movements everywhere. The fact that the big unions occasionally aver this in order to prove the high morality of their policy does not settle the issue, of course; but they may be right, to a certain extent. In the dynamic economy all propositions familiar from the static economy need reexamining.

Nevertheless it is true that the concept of solidarity that prevails in European labor is tied to the class structure of European society and loses this prop as that structure turns out to belong not to capitalism as such but only within a feudalistic tradition and atmosphere. Class means something fixed, unchangeable, hereditary, and class solidarity is the solidarity of the disinherited. In this country the cultivation of "brotherhood" in the unions is highly developed. But all experience teaches the worker that he need not feel disinherited, that his style of life, though perhaps narrower, is not essentially different from that of other persons and groups, and that he will soon be able to afford what he still lacks. The roofs of the apartment houses in the poorer sections of the cities are being covered with television masts, and the parking spaces around the big factories are immense. This does not mean at all that the battle of warring interests has been softened. The air of the country—precisely because of the absence of an original, however hierarchically structured, unity—is of an astonishing recklessness and full of noise, exaggerations, and avarice in public propaganda and advertising. But since the opinion prevails that by robust aggressiveness one can get somewhere, there is no possible basis for class sentiment and solidarity. (An only apparent exception is that of populous groups of immigrants in the major cities; their members are too old and too unversatile to overcome the inhibitions of language and imported mentality, but the second generation is commonly assimilated, first of all by the public school, and estranged from the tradition of its parents.)

It is only in this context that the position of the union leaders in the unions themselves can be correctly appraised. A European reader is shocked when he learns that a number of them have salaries of \$20,000 or \$30,000, that two receive \$50,000, one \$60,000, several with employment contracts for life; that all receive in addition liberal payments for expenses incurred for the transportation due their rank and for accommodation in the best hotels on business trips. Obviously business mentality has here

completely superseded any class mentality. Not only do the labor leaders take what they can get—and they take it from the workers' union dues—but the workers themselves find this perfectly all right if, on the other hand, their union leader brings them enough wage and other improvements. His successes do not at all depend on his class mentality but altogether on his skill as a negotiator. His chances, however, are strengthened if he can meet the entrepreneurs on a socially equal footing, power to power, so they cannot have the feeling of impressing him personally. These facts are well known, and have effectively been described by Mills. They are completed by general observations concerning the lack of democratic control over the leadership in most unions, not to speak of class solidarity: the business atmosphere of the country has engulfed the unions. There are exceptions, most conspicuous among whom is the best known of the labor leaders, Walter Reuther; he continues to cherish principle and has, as a symbol of it, consistently refused to accept the increase of his salary beyond \$15,000 which his union, the automobile workers, deems desirable for its prestige among the other unions. In the second and third ranks there are many persons of real modesty and readiness to sacrifice.

The wage policy of the unions differs from that customary in Europe particularly in establishing a direct connection between the wage and the increase of productivity. This is problematic in itself, because the firm's ability to pay depends on its profitability, which need not coincide with its productivity: either of the two can exist without the other. In the great depression production shrank but productivity increased, with the result that costs and prices in terms of the new higher value of money could also decrease. But in general, without crisis, prices remain stable when productivity rises; this seems to be the premise underlying the demand that wages must rise in order that the workers can share in the fruits of rising productivity.

Such a rising wage scale was first offered the workers in a contract with General Motors, in the form of a 2.5 percent increase

each year of the duration of the contract, regardless of the indices of productivity or production (though a connection between wages and the living-cost index exists, of course). Since productivity obviously does not rise by the same rate every year, but irregularly, the contractual rate of annual wage rise must correspond to the hypothetical average of the rise of productivity through a number of years. What is implied is that it is the firm's duty to increase productivity and thereby make a wage rise possible; should the firm fail this duty it deserves to get squeezed. Discussion in the unions seems merciless in drawing this conclusion; a less progressive enterprise should not be permitted to survive. Hence the demand for one wage rate in one industry throughout the country. This is a far cry from the original Marxist doctrine that the workers in the age of monopoly capitalism must "take over" industry in order to save it from the paralysis of progress.¹⁰

In the same context we also have the demand for the "guaranteed annual wage," which was asserted by the automobile workers in 1955. To be sure, what was attained is neither a guaranteed nor a strictly annual wage, for the industry engaged itself to pay dismissed workers only up to 65 percent of their wage for the remainder of the year, and in several states there are legal obstacles, as the unemployment compensation that is supposed to contribute the last third is not in force so long as the employer pays an indemnity. Evidently the expectation is that such obstacles will be removed by legislative action. But then the real economic problem arises: how far can industry undergo any partial commitment of this kind unless it reserves to itself the right to employ the worker in a different job and possibly in a different place, depending on such factors as changing directions of demand or technical innovations or changing advantages of industrial location? Stabilization of wages requires

¹⁰ For the problem of a productivity-oriented wage policy see Frieda Wunderlich, "Bemerkungen zur amerikanischen Produktivität," in *IFO Studien*, vol. 2, no. 1 (1956), and Elisabeth Liefmann-Keil, "Produktivitätsorientierte Lohnpolitik," in *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv*, vol. 76, no. 2 (1956).

stabilization of employment, and this, in a time of extreme economic dynamics, seems to be possible only through the highest degree of mobility in the utilization of labor. After all this is said, however, the sensation that the innovation produced internationally seems only the more justified. For all its grave unresolved problems, the new measure recognizes the principle of industry's responsibility for the economic existence of its employees, while at the same time the unions are to see to it that the guarantee of economic existence does not lead to social dependence. Nowhere can one see more clearly than at this point how far the new solutions are removed from classical socialism on the one hand and from classical capitalism on the other hand.

It must not be inferred, however, that the unions always content themselves with demanding and trusting the resourcefulness of management. Without a staff of competent and highly paid engineers and experts in organization and accounting, the unions would never be able either to claim their "control rights" in the jobs or to discharge the inherent responsibilities discussed above. Through the words of the late Philip Murray, the beloved leader of the steel workers, the unions boasted of knowing everything necessary about techniques, because of their engineers, and exactly as much as the entrepreneurs. Their knowledge allows them to step in where a firm is unable to manage its contractual obligations. This happened in a steel works in Alabama which could not pay the nationally agreed upon wage rate: the union's experts produced a plan for the rationalization of the mill, and the execution of the plan was financed by a loan from the union—with striking success. It was a loan, not an investment. Capitalism? Socialism?

On the largest scale the case is duplicated in the clothing industries of the big cities. To be sure, conditions there are unique. Speaking in economic terms, the trade as a whole, with the exception of a few prosperous and well known firms, has been suffering for decades from poor markets, only slightly improved recently, and is splintered into thousands of small shops. Speaking socio-

logically, the clothing industry is a reservation for many hundreds of thousands of still unassimilated immigrants, primarily East European Jews, and also Italians, who continue to practice here the skills acquired in their native countries and to cultivate in the hardly changed environment the old ideas and aspirations, disciplined by religious orthodoxy. Hence there are many cases where no social distance exists between employer and employee; they may perhaps live in the same building in the Jewish or Italian quarter, and may be closely related to one another. The Polish Jews have brought with them a developed tradition of labor-union socialism, and in so far as the Italians, from southern Italy, do not bring it with them nothing prevents them from acquiring it; the Roman Catholic clergy who minister to them come almost exclusively from the poorest groups of Irish immigrants, and are most likely to be found on the side of labor in labor disputes.

In this combination of economic and social factors the textile and clothing industry has taken a peculiar development. A weak and chronically sick industry is opposed by a formidable union power; the union leaders have been highly respected for decades—the late Sidney Hillman was President Roosevelt's trusted adviser on labor questions, which were of decisive importance at that time—but the members depend for their livelihood on a weak industry. Nothing, therefore, suggests itself more logically than the use of the union's power for the strengthening of the industry. Not only was technical rationalization planned, elaborated, and financed by the union in many shops, but above all the union and its experts focused their attention on the demoralized market itself, undertaking to organize it and, as much as possible, to anchor its organization in the collective agreement, for the sake of steady employment.

When it is the workers who do such a thing, it is called planned economy; when it is the entrepreneurs, it is called, with a name taboo in America and not popular elsewhere, a cartel. Anyway, the result is that the old social democrats of the textile and cloth-

ing unions control not only the jobs but often management too; they prescribe its ways and, in this sense, "take over" their industries, but without directly investing in them or seizing the properties wholly or partly. The capital risk for labor's proposals remains with the entrepreneurs, the wage and employment risk, naturally, always with the workers. The resultant structure, whose three elements are acute distress, imported tradition, and the unique climate of the new country, can perhaps be called a denatured socialism.¹¹

The socialism emancipated from its class basis and therefore estranged from the idea of class property amounts, apart from extreme cases, to collective self-help. Its economic form, again apart from extreme cases, is countervailing monopoly. Collective self-help and countervailing monopoly are logical, but even so they did not materialize, in the case of the workers, without political pressure and legal foundation. But then, there is no reason why these ideas should not be applicable outside labor too, for defense against onesided economic power.

The fundamental change that is under way in the American economic constitution, without a clearly discernible goal and entirely without theoretical guidance, can best be observed in certain events within the business community itself. A conspicuous example is the relations between the automobile industry and the dealers in new cars, who are not only the direct customers of the industry but thereby also its scouts and reporters at the front of consumption in all big and small places. Each of them has to give evidence of a business capital of at least \$100,000, and there are 42,000 of them. The business contracts between them and the big manufacturers are subject, of course, to the general

¹¹ This policy is supported even by such entrepreneurs as are, themselves, far from needing help. When one of the unions had victoriously asserted the new strategy in New York and Chicago and tried it out successfully, it ran into opposition to its draft for a collective agreement with the entrepreneurs in Philadelphia. Thereupon the union telephoned to a big entrepreneur in Chicago, its good friend, and asked him to go to Philadelphia and enlist his colleagues there. The assignment was accepted with pleasure and discharged with success.

stipulations of commercial law, but to no other restrictions; the factory is no longer free to dismiss a worker at will, but it can give notice to a dealer as his contract expires. So much the more remarkable is it that General Motors has found it advisable—obviously in line with its business interest—to establish a board of review where a dealer threatened with the loss of his business can undertake to furnish evidence that the notice is objectively unjustified.

The motive behind this institution must be that, if the man concerned happens to be a respected member of the local community, the destruction of his existence by one stroke of the pen would breed ill blood. It is hard to say how much in the innovation is attributable to a pure business interest and how much to the pressure of democratic public opinion, which no longer tolerates the idea that the existence of a man should depend on the private discretion of another man—is not the publicity of all economic relations a possible definition of socialism? Indeed, one state has drawn the conclusion that the plaintiff's right to sue must not depend on the defendant's generosity, and has created a court of appeal; similar measures are under consideration in other states.¹² The direction and goal of this development are not clearly discernible at present; what is clear is only that the right to private arbitrariness is negated, nay, is no longer defended even by its beneficiary.

The same business group, however, passed through a grave moral crisis in 1955, which reminds us that gentlemanly behavior, while easy in prosperity, is far from assured when business deteriorates. An abrupt sharp reduction of sales, coupled with continuing production, embarrassed the big companies, and they resorted to pressure on their dealers to get rid of the unsalable cars by opaque and shabby combinations of rebates, respites, instalments, and interest rates. They went to such lengths that the dealers in several parts of the country revolted and finally brought the

¹² The state referred to is Rhode Island; the facts are from Berle (cited above, note 2).

quarrel to the newspapers and to the United States Senate. The Senate called hearings under oath, and in them the biggest men of the industry came off so pitifully that they had to give up the attempt to demonstrate their disdain for the entire procedure, take on themselves the responsibility for the recent happenings, and promise immediate redress. The recovery of the market came to their aid. But the publicity of relations, their subjection under the moral judgment of political democracy, is no less significant for it. Is this still capitalism?

III¹³

In the preliminary way and with the reserve becoming to an observer of a development in full swing, the dual question from which we started and which gave orientation to this brief survey can be answered thus: both capitalism and socialism are tamed by democracy. As for capitalism, the blind naturalism of anonymous, quasi-automatic market processes is subjected to human criteria and made responsible before them. Socialism is denatured in the sense that it accepts the entrepreneurial function of capitalism, even where socialism itself is immensely superior in organizational and financial power and must lend it out occasionally lest its control of the jobs, its own reservation, be drawn into ruin along with business. Back of this, however, is the dominant experience of the productivity of capitalism, which pulls the sociological basis from under socialism by dissolving the sheathing of proletarian existence and ideology.

Nevertheless, it would be wrong to say that capitalism has refuted socialism and absorbed it into itself. The human motive of socialism uses the special sociological conditions of proletarian

¹³ See Edgar Salin, *Oekonomik der Atomkraft* (Cologne 1955); Georges Friedmann's most important study, *Où va le travail humain?* (Paris 1950); Robert Jungk's striking reports, *Tomorrow is Already Here* (New York 1954); Eduard Heimann, "The Economy of Abundance," with comments by Chester Barnard, J. M. Clark, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Noël Sargent, in *Social Action* (January 1957); Paul Tillich, "The Person in a Technical Society," in John A. Hutchison, ed., *Christian Faith and Social Action* (New York 1953).

existence to create special institutions of common property and economic planning, but it is oriented toward the humanization of man's work, which under the rule of efficiency was abandoned to "reification" (made into a thing). Without this reification the breakthrough of productivity would not have been possible; it would have been prevented by tradition-rooted human inhibitions. But as the new principle reinforced itself it became clear that reification is no viable state of society, and that human experiences and aspirations must be revalidated even in economic life, lest the peace of society collapse under the weight of the requirements of economic productivity and bury economic life under itself. It is the great accomplishment of democracy to have solved the proletarian problem by convincing socialism of the indispensability of capitalist productivity, and convincing capitalism of the equally indispensable human dignity of labor as the condition of its own success. In this limited sense, in respect of the form, not the content of the process, we could say that the reconciliation of the opposites is the way from Marx to Hegel.

But the reification has not been overcome. As the proletarian problem is solved by productivity, the claim to supremacy of productivity is borne out. Now productivity is a means for ends exterior to itself; it must be measured against these and limited by them. No such objective, however, is visible; productivity and efficiency become their own ends and justification in a blind dynamic and with everybody's approval. Democracy, too, immensely strengthened by productivity, accepts the claim of productivity to supremacy. If there ever was an illusion about this, it vanishes in view of atomic technology and automation. The terrible logic of atomic science forces the big powers ahead from weapon to weapon, and requires for its application, according to all reports from the experimental stations, a "making over" of man. Automation delivers man from mechanical drudgery, but for a similar price: it empties man's work of mastership, workmanship, doing, and at best restricts it to a mere intellectual exercise but at worst, in view of the perfection and unimaginably

complex performance of the machines, subjects man, the imperfect machine, to the necessary improvements and adaptations. The more we do this, the more commodities and leisure time we can have. But leisure time, too, is then mechanized to bring us, in rapid succession and variation, all emotions of sex, crime, war, and religion for our entertainment and thus kill the sense of the tragic greatness of human life. Nobody knows at the present time how the new techniques will affect man and democracy, and how man can and should react. Only one thing is clear: that instead of gaining control of ourselves through science, we are abandoned to the creatures of our mind.

Reification for the purpose of productivity is a part, or a consequence, of what Karl Marx called "alienation." This was Marx's central philosophical notion, which he took over from Hegel, alienation of man from man and of man from himself: the unity of communal life and the unity of personal life are lost and should be recovered on a higher plane. Hegel's failure, as he saw the promised harmony emerge "behind the backs of people" through "the cunning of the idea," kindled Marx's protest: no harmony was possible without seizing and transmuting the real life of man primarily in his work. Marx's failure, as comprehensive collectivization, instead of bringing the promised universal personalization, becomes more than ever stuck in alienation, nay, brings it to a head, kindles the democratic undertaking to wrest from alienation some humanity in man's work. But it would be presumptuous to maintain that democracy has overcome alienation, or is superior to it. Democracy drifts into the new technology without a will of its own; it surrenders spiritual life to the machinery of entertainment, and personal life to family corrosion and split consciousness. Alienation prevails, and the spiritual locus of socialism remains vacant.

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BOOK REVIEWS

FRIEDMAN, MAURICE S. *Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1955. x & 310 pp. \$6.

Philosophers have divided themselves into the tender and the tough-minded, the hedgehogs and the foxes, the objective and the subjective thinkers—but these distinctions still provide no way of showing the radical difference between the styles of philosophizing characteristic of, say, Russell, Moore, and Dewey, on the one hand, and Bergson, Marcel, and Buber on the other. The qualitative gap between these thinkers is defined by an existential concern (or its lack) which recognizes, first, transcendence as a valid philosophical category; second, intuition (in the broadest sense) as a valid philosophical instrument; third, uniqueness as a valid philosophical starting point. In the case of Martin Buber we are able to add a fourth and decisive existential quality, that of dialogue as the very matrix of true philosophizing. Thus we may submit a new classification: philosophers are either “unilogical” or “dialogical,” depending on whether the audience of the philosopher is, in Buber’s terms, treated as “It” or as “Thou,” and whether, concomitantly, the philosopher is taken as “It” or as “Thou” by his audience. The difference between the “unilogical” and the “dialogical” is absolutely essential to Buber’s position, and provides us with an approach to Dr. Friedman’s study of Buber’s thought.

Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue is a comprehensive interpretive exposition of the philosopher’s thought in the entire range of its application by an author who gives every indication of profound sympathy and, to a great extent, personal identification with his subject’s standpoint, outlook, and method. In addition to a statement of Buber’s philosophy of “I” and “Thou” in all of its complexity, Dr. Friedman presents an account of Buber’s religious, theological, biblical, historical, social, psychological, and educational concepts, their growth and development. Although the volume is not biographical in intent, the author succeeds in giving the reader a vivid sense of Buber’s presence throughout the book. Dr. Friedman’s efforts have resulted in an inclusive and thorough account of the mind of a major living philosopher. The treatment generally is of a consistently high quality, providing the reader with a faithful and insightful introduction to Buber’s thought. Undoubtedly the book should and will serve as a standard work in the field.

The following minor reservations regarding the exposition may be summarily listed before going on to more interesting and important critical remarks. First, some of the earlier chapters (notably 4-7) appear to have been condensed or at least restricted in development—by publisher's space limitations, one would guess. Second, although the author stresses Buber's indebtedness to Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Dostoyevsky, the full relationship Buber bears to these thinkers is not thoroughly analyzed (probably again for lack of space). A separate chapter devoted to Buber's relation to these figures would have added greatly to the volume. This is especially true of Buber's indebtedness to Dostoyevsky. And finally, the intent of the author is to present an interpretive exposition and analysis, but it is not clear to what extent he projected a critical work. Dr. Friedman's evaluations are considerably closer to creative exposition than they are to critical analysis. Once again, it is to be regretted that the author did not, or was not able to, include a chapter of direct criticism, which, it seems to me, a dialogic work even calls for.

For present purposes I shall restrict critical discussion to one phase of Buber's thought: his theory of knowledge, especially its implications for a philosophy of the social world. In view of the dialogical character of Buber's thought, as well as of Dr. Friedman's book, I shall not adhere to what is ordinarily a prime principle of reviewing: distinguishing rigorously between criticism of the book and criticism of the subject of the book. In the case of Buber I shall enter into dialogue with the problems themselves. I accept Dr. Friedman's treatment as a true image of Buber's theory of knowledge, and now turn to that theory itself, and so to Professor Buber and Dr. Friedman at the same time.

I should like to consider Buber's theory of knowledge by taking up the following topics, all of which are related to his cardinal insight, the "I-Thou" relationship: first, the problem of an "I-Thou" relationship with nature; second, the character of "betweenness" as a structure in human relations; third, the general problem of intersubjectivity; and fourth, some methodological considerations.

1) Defending Buber's claim that an inanimate object in nature may be a "Thou" for some "I," Dr. Friedman maintains that charges of "animism or mystical 'projection'" at this point are invalid because such charges are based on thinking rooted in the categories of "I-It" systems of thought. In the presence of meeting in the "I-Thou" relationship, however, he claims that "it is no longer true . . . that the existing beings over against us cannot in some sense move to meet

us as we them" (p. 170). Thus "A tree can 'say' something to me and become my Thou" (though I cannot be a Thou for it). But even if we were to accept the notion that there is "some sense" in which the inanimate objects move to meet us, it is not possible, I think, to maintain that they move to meet us *as we them*. If there is a meeting, it is, I would suggest, between aspects of my own "I" as it enters into relatedness with an object of special signification. The object's "move" to meet me is a feature of my awareness of its character, as that awareness is focused in the relationship. The object never achieves full status, as does the human "Thou," but must remain below the threshold of true presence. Two directions seem open to Buber at this juncture: his later thought, as Dr. Friedman points out, stresses the qualitative difference between man and natural objects and reveals man as the unique interior reality capable of reciprocal relationships; the other direction tends toward the views of the later Heidegger, who investigates man's relation to "what there is" in terms of the voice Being gives to things which "speak" to man as their "shepherd." Buber's advance seems to move clearly along the lines of the former direction.

2) Central to Buber's "I-Thou" philosophy is his stress on the *relation* of "I" to "Thou" as the crucial reality of dialogue. The hyphenation of "I-Thou" is a necessity, not a device, which manifests itself in the *presence* of the "Thou" to the "I," presence understood as arising *between* the persons of the dialogue. Now I wish to ask what "between" really signifies here. A "Thou" is always a "Thou" for some "I," and in dialogue presumably recognizes itself as a "Thou" for some "I." But mutual recognition is not equivalent to "betweenness." To say that there is a "shared" reality, one in which the "whole being" of the "I" and "Thou" confront each other in immediacy, is to rely on a terminological regression in which translation is never complete and an appeal to the actual experience is ultimately the end product. But appreciating a distinction and explicating it philosophically are different things. "Betweenness" is an ultimate term for Buber; it signifies what I think is a crucial experience, one, nevertheless, that is not given constitutive clarification. As a generative idea the "betweenness" of dialogue is of major importance, but the idea remains, in Buber's work as well as in Dr. Friedman's study, epistemologically unexamined.

3) The question of the meaning of "betweenness" is really part of a larger problem—that of intersubjectivity as perhaps the root issue

of epistemology as well as the philosophical region in which Buber's "I-Thou" analysis has its locus. I venture the paradoxical suggestion that for Buber there is no problem of intersubjectivity and the "I-Thou" philosophy is its solution. If Buber's fundamental premise "As I become I, I say Thou" is accepted, there is no question of how the ego ever comes to knowledge and comprehension of alter egos, for the meeting in the presence of "I" and "Thou" is a prime relation that establishes the connection between egos as integral *from the outset*. It is no longer possible to raise the epistemological question with respect to others within the range of "I-Thou" relationships; it would appear that this question remains possible and valid only for "I-It" modes of relatedness.

It is not necessary to follow the traditional subject-object dualism, rejected by Buber, to ask how the "I-Thou" relationship may be illuminated at the epistemological level beyond reiterating the key substantives which announce presence and betweenness. Buber does speak of an "inborn" and "a priori" Thou, and Dr. Friedman writes of Buber's idea of "the innate potentiality of becoming a person through meeting" (p. 164), but again no epistemic access to these structures is evidenced, though an interesting footnote (p. 175) regarding Buber's forthcoming work on problems of philosophical anthropology may be a clue to a breakthrough in this direction. Here Buber offers the challenging suggestion that "our relation to nature [and ultimately to other selves] is founded on numberless connections between movements to something and perceptions of something. Even the images of fantasy, dreams, delirium, draw their material from this foundation; our speech and our thinking are rooted in it and cannot withdraw from it without losing their tie with life; even mathematics must concretize itself ever again in the relationship with it." At the present point, however, these remarks are only a promise as a corrective to what remains, thus far, a failure to engage the philosophical problem of intersubjectivity underlying the "I-Thou" relation.

4) A final problem of method may be raised. It is not clear whether Dr. Friedman interprets Buber as suggesting the "I-Thou" relation as a mode of reality within which and through which authentic philosophical analysis may take place, or as constituting a reality to be described and evaluated. "I-Thou" knowing cannot, according to Dr. Friedman (p. 168), be analyzed by "I-It" categories. But, we may ask, can "I-It" structures be analyzed by "I-Thou" knowing? The social world contains essential "I-It" components, and the problem

is to come to a full understanding of them. Is such a task alien to the intention of "I-Thou" knowing? If "I-It" reality is taken as inauthentic, is not inauthenticity a problem in the comprehension of social reality? And is our task, then, comprehending social reality or transforming it? An approach to these questions requires a methodological distinction Buber does not make between relations as structures of social reality to be described and interpreted and relations as active agencies of knowledge through which the social world is transformed. As I suggest in most of my criticism, Professor Buber's sins here are those of omission.

The preceding remarks are offered in a dialogical spirit and treat, once again, only one aspect—though a foundational one—of the range of Buber's thought. It must be left to others, better qualified, to discuss Dr. Friedman's excellent presentation of Buber's ideas on such subjects as Hasidism, biblical interpretation, and Jewish history. From these, as from the work as a whole, the reader profits from the author's mastery of the incredible inventory of Buber's interests. But most valuable of all in this book, I feel, is the sense of dialogical philosophizing which permeates its pages and reveals the full image and humanity of its central figure. In the end, Buber teaches us, the trick is not, in that ugly phrase, "to take apart" another thinker, but rather to come into integral awareness of his unity and so to take one small step toward realizing the meaning of man: "to make the broken world whole."

MAURICE NATANSON

University of Houston

COTTRELL, FRED. *Energy and Society: The Relation Between Energy, Social Change, and Economic Development*. New York: McGraw-Hill. 1955. xix & 330 pp. \$6.

In the words of its author, who is Professor of Government and Sociology at Miami University in Oxford, Ohio, the thesis of this book is "simple": that the energy available to man limits what he *can* do and influences what he *will* do. The elaboration of this "simple" thesis is, however, quite complicated. It leads the author, on the one hand, to trace the historical forms of energy and of the methods of converting it to human use, and, on the other hand, to correlate the changes in energy and in its converters with changes in the economic, political, and social evolution of mankind.

The sequence in the use of energy is from readily available sources such as plant life and draft animals, which are of low yield, to wind, flowing streams, coal and other mineral fuels, electricity, and nuclear power, which are increasingly high-yield in character. To this sequence in types of energy corresponds the alleged sequence in social evolution—from the simple forms of low-energy food-gathering and food-raising societies to those of trading and manufacturing and finally to the high-energy industrialism of modern times. The connecting link between the types and amounts of energy and the social structure is provided by the type of converter needed to put the energy to human use. The sequence of converters begins with the organic process of man's direct consumption of plants and animals, and evolves through the invention and use of the windmill, the sailing ship, the steam engine, the internal-combustion and diesel engine.

It is the way in which successive converters have influenced economic and social development that forms the central part of Professor Cottrell's book. As the author puts it, his aim is "to discover the relations between the energy converters and fuel men use and the kinds of societies they build." In this respect his book is a survey of major historical technological changes and of their effects on economic structure and social interrelations. In treating this theme the author supplies many illuminating pages on the influence of technology on such historic developments as the decline of the Roman Empire, the passing of feudalism, the rise of a commercial class, and the predominance gained in the Western world by the modern factory and capitalistic enterprise. While burdened somewhat by too much detail, the chapters tracing these successive stages of social-economic history throw interesting light on the development of economic institutions and on the dynamics of social change.

Professor Cottrell does not limit himself, however, to a historical survey, but attempts to use the concept of energy as a "common denominator" in formulating a theoretical view of value, international trade, and economic behavior in general. In his view, man's economic calculations and activities are determined by the possibility of "surplus energy," that is, by the opportunity to obtain more energy from using a converter than was put into the making of it. Energy is thus a measure of "opportunity cost" and of real value, and the basis of the international exchange of goods. The author goes into detailed comparisons of the caloric input and output of various converters, such as the hoe and the plough, human transport and the sailing vessel,

handicraft and machines, to illustrate and prove that the adoption of one converter in preference to another is due to the ultimate gain in surplus energy.

On the basis of such comparisons he reaches some unorthodox conclusions, for instance, that more food and energy can be produced from a unit of land without machines than with them and thus that hand methods of intensive cultivation are preferable if it is desired to provide support for the largest possible population (pp. 142-43). While this conclusion may seem startling, it is not without support from other students of economic development: an argument along similar lines is made by Professor W. Arthur Lewis in his comprehensive book on *The Theory of Economic Growth* (p. 128). The difficulty with Professor Cottrell's thesis is not in one or another particular conclusion but in the fact, which he himself admits, that computations of energy are too complex to be a sure guide in the process of valuation, and individuals and groups do not always follow the lines of comparative advantage but do things "the hard way" in response to traditional motivations and social values that are stronger than the desire to economize energy.

Professor Cottrell also applies his "thesis" in an effort to interpret current problems and to predict the future course of social development. Since he covers very wide ground indeed—problems of the family, political ideas and practices, democratic government, centralization of power and bureaucracy, war and the modern state, Point Four programs and international relations, and much more—it is not possible to follow him in this brief review. Some of his observations and predictions may, however, be noted. He concludes, for instance, that nuclear power is not likely to work a major revolution in areas now well supplied with other power sources, and that the great coal beds will continue to determine the distribution and power relations of high-energy societies. He thinks that "the political party which favors policies that will increasingly use the energy of North America 'at home' is more likely to find allies among the voters and stockholders than that party which persists in pursuing more elaborate systems of international organization" (p. 307). He foresees, in the short run, the emergence of at least three geographically fairly well defined systems using high-energy technology—North America, England and Germany, and Russia—each of which will have a varying number of satellites in its orbit. The resulting unstable equilibrium will in his opinion force compromises which, if continued over a long period of time, are

likely to establish a balance of power leading to a loose federal system that may obviate war and implement "universal values" through a strengthened United Nations.

All that need be said here about these observations and predictions is that, interesting as they may be, they do not necessarily follow from the basic "thesis." In fact, one may query why and how the use of the same high-energy technology can sustain three such different social systems as those of the United States, England, and Russia. Professor Cottrell shows awareness of the limitations of his analysis in the many qualifications sprinkled throughout his book, which indicate that social changes are not determined by energy changes alone. It would be ungracious to press criticism farther in view of his disarming final statement that "any attempt to deal with such a complex of variables as is involved in predicting the course of civilization must be to some degree a failure" (p. 311).

Despite its limitations, Professor Cottrell's study is a valuable contribution to the analysis of economic development and social adaptation. This reviewer particularly welcomes such a study as *Energy and Society* since he finds in it confirmation of a view he expressed some years ago (*Time for Planning*, 1945), that the concept of energy offers a fruitful approach to the interpretation of social-economic history. He certainly agrees that what Professor Cottrell modestly calls his "essay" suggests whole areas of ignorance whose exploration might increase the accuracy of our thinking about the future development of human society.

LEWIS L. LORWIN

New School for Social Research

MANNHEIM, KARL, ed. by Ernest Manheim in cooperation with Paul Kecskemeti. *Essays on the Sociology of Culture*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1956. ix & 253 pp. \$6.

This is the fourth, and final, volume in the English-language edition of Mannheim's sociological writings. It makes available, for the first time, a manuscript written shortly before Hitler's triumph in 1933. After his emigration to England, Mannheim made revisions in his German draft, but eventually set it aside in favor of his studies on problems of social reform under British conditions.

The three essays contained in the present volume—concerning "the sociology of the mind," "the problem of the intelligentsia," and "the democratization of culture"—follow the author's *Ideology and Utopia*

as a sequel as well as a new departure, as Ernest Mannheim points out in his introduction. They strongly underline the fact that *Ideology and Utopia*, Mannheim's "classical" sociology of knowledge, was actually another point of transition in the author's restless theoretical development. In the present essays Mannheim still refers back to his major publication. For instance, he further elaborates the role of the intelligentsia in society, adds to his discussion of the social conditioning of epistemological orientations, and qualifies his prior views on the "unattachedness" of intellectual strata. Other considerations, like his discussion of political elite groups in a democratic society, may be viewed as an extension of the earlier study. But in their main tendencies the present essays show Mannheim moving out of the sphere of that radical historicism that characterized *Ideology and Utopia*. He turns toward more empirical orientations, and accepts the nominalistic conception of social theory. Ernest Mannheim views this shift as central to "the aim of constructing types and suggesting typical relationships which are capable of empirical verification and refinement" (p. 8).

Indeed, this was Mannheim's intention. He marks his retreat from historicism by correcting several of the views central to his earlier sociology of knowledge. The thesis that truth is immanent in the historical process is replaced by Comte's positivistic formula: "to know and to foresee in order to act" (p. 160). And the implication that the historical process, on its own, moves in the "right" direction is replaced by a voluntaristic interpretation of social action. "The positive type of modern thinker," Mannheim argues, "will become increasingly sociological in his thinking not in order to deify the social, but in order to neutralize its negative effects concerning ultimate human values" (p. 244). Mannheim exchanged his earlier conception of sociology of knowledge for the concept of a sociology of the mind as an instrument auxiliary to social decision-making.

Most likely Mannheim executed this significant shift under the impression of the upsurge of National Socialism in the depression period. He expressly discusses the problems of a political dictatorship in the third part of his essays. But like many liberal German intellectuals of those years, he grossly underestimated the magnitude of these problems. Postulating that "a democratizing trend is our predestined fate" (p. 171), he here views dictatorship not as the "antithesis of democracy" but as "one of the possible ways in which a democratic society may try to solve its problems" (p. 172). The downfall of democracy, he argues with sociological justification, results

from the working of "innumerable self-neutralizing factors that develop within the democratic system" (p. 174). But the emerging "plebiscitarian dictatorship" itself, as the German experience has demonstrated, is more than "the self-neutralization of political democracy" (p. 172), characterized, after Max Scheler, as a "democracy of Impulse" (p. 173) and as an expression of a "socially induced stupidity" (p. 178, n. 1). The sociological reduction of the forms of modern dictatorship to the complexities, and inner contradictions, of a democratic system appears not to be warranted.

Here Mannheim no longer treats sociology as an instrument for recognition of the historical process in its unfolding totality. Rather, he differentiates three dimensions of sociological analysis: general, comparative, and structural (p. 58). General sociology has precedence over the others. It is most abstract, and concerns itself with universal "functional characteristics" of "acts of sociation" as "conceived in relative isolation from their historical incidence" (p. 56). This is "formal sociology" in the sense of Georg Simmel and others. The formal categories of a general sociology, Mannheim reasons, should be used to "systematically cover" the "historical variations" by means of historical-comparative studies. For such a purpose a second level of analysis, the historical dimension, must be reached. Being more concrete than the first, it should allow "the constructive grasp of the singularity of historical structures," and an "understanding of the broad structural changes which become manifest on the various levels of social interaction" (p. 57). On the third, or structural, level, "which proceeds from single components and their immediate causal relationships to the structural complex" (p. 57), a comprehension of the "dynamics of complete structures" is prepared (p. 58). Thus the three dimensions of sociological analysis overlap. General and historical analyses are combined in the fields of comparative studies, and historical and structural analyses are joined in the investigation of the "dynamics of change."

The new "sociology of the mind," here identical with a "sociology of culture" (p. 81, n. 1), operates on all three levels of sociological analysis. Its "primary aim" is "the study of mental processes and significations in their social context." This study starts with an "axiomatic view" (general analysis), treating "the basic constants of sociation which condition continuity, tradition, discontinuity, and the dynamics of thought." It is followed by a "comparative typology" (historical-comparative analysis), elaborating "concrete variations of elementary social processes" and identifying "their corresponding variations in the

realm of thought." Structural analysis, finally, is attempted in the form of a "sociology of individuation," dealing with the genesis of structures of social thought by considering, first, the "relationship of social motivations to thought structures," and second, "the significance of social groupings for the genesis of standpoints." This analysis is to be completed by a treatment of the "dynamics of structures," concerned with "social change and its significance for the concrete dynamics of thought" (see pp. 88-89).

Essentially the present essays embody Mannheim's attempt to work out a new sociology of knowledge, a system that would avoid the historicist bent of *Ideology and Utopia* and instead offer a framework for empirical investigations. It is not possible here to appraise the merits of this attempt; may it suffice to say that it is fraught with pertinent suggestions and ideas, which it should be worth while to follow up.

HELMUT R. WAGNER

Bucknell University

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*published quarterly by the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Or-
ganization, 19 Avenue Kléber, Paris 16**

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
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